Reconstructing Democratic Lawmaking through the Right of Opposition: Redressing Power Imbalances in Indonesia's Constitutional Design

1. Introduction

In recent years, there have been indications of a decline in the quality of the lawmaking process in Indonesia. Empirical research and normative studies reveal a pattern in which governing coalitions have become excessively broad and homogeneous, eroding the substantive scrutiny and deliberation functions within the parliament. This pattern, often referred to as a fat coalition (or oversized coalition), has led to legislative practices that tend to be swift and merely consensual, while the space for critical and alternative voices has narrowed. The practical impact is evident in bills that undergo abbreviated processes, inadequate handling of the Problem Inventory List (Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah-DIM), which contains substantive objections, and the absence of formal space for minority notes or counter-drafts recorded in official minutes. These findings and case documentations provide a strong initial diagnosis that there is a structural problem in the balance of roles within the legislative institution.

The experience of lawmaking during President Joko Widodo's leadership, particularly from 2019–2024—such as the Amendment to the Corruption Eradication Commission Law (UU KPK) in 2020, the Amendment to the Constitutional Court Law (UU MK) in 2020, the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja) in 2020, the National Capital City Law (UU IKN) in 2022 and 2023, the Health Law (UU Kesehatan) in 2023, the Ministry of State Law (UU Kementerian Negara) in 2024, as well as laws produced under Prabowo Subianto's administration in early 2025 (the State-Owned Enterprises Law (UU BUMN), the Mineral and Coal Mining Law (UU Mineral dan Batubara), and the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law (UU TNI))—demonstrates that the legislative process often occurs rapidly, opaquely, and tends to be undemocratic. In these cases, legal research identifies key indicators of autocratic legalism, one of which is the co-optation of political parties in parliament.

In one of our articles entitled "Constitutional Repair through Opposition Reform: Designing the Right of the Opposition and Incentive Systems to Counter Democratic Deterioration in Indonesia", we have proposed efforts to repair the structure of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) by advocating for the institutionalization of opposition rights and the provision of incentives as part of constitutional repair. This approach emphasizes that repair does not always necessitate major constitutional amendments but can take the form of specific and measurable normative interventions that address broken institutional functions. In the context of opposition, the article's recommendations highlight two main points: formal recognition of the opposition's role and the design of incentives to ensure the opposition has the substantive capacity to participate meaningfully in the lawmaking process. Aligned with the theme of the 5th International Conference for Democracy and National Resilience (ICDNR), "Reclaiming Democratic Lawmaking: Meaningful Participation as a Tool to Dismantle Oligarchy and Advance Green and Digital Justice," specifically the sub-topic "Democratic Lawmaking and Power Structures," this article will build upon previous research findings regarding the institutionalization of opposition rights, particularly within the lawmaking process, which is expected to establish power balances within the DPR that contribute to the process of reconstructing democratic lawmaking in Indonesia.

This article argues that the institutionalization of the opposition along with its rights and incentives is part of an extensive interpretation, both explicit and implicit, within the Indonesian Constitution (the 1945 Constitution). This is precisely because the spirit of the constitutional reforms during the 1999–2002 Amendments to the 1945 Constitution was the need for a DPR capable of performing checks and balances, as formulated in Article 20A paragraph (1), which states "The DPR shall hold the functions of legislation, budgeting, and oversight." As a form of this extensive interpretation, this article seeks to elaborate and rationalize these ideas so that they can be incorporated into the Law on the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, and the Regional Houses of Representatives (MD3 Law), the Law on the Making of Legislation (P3 Law), and the internal regulations of the DPR.

This article will provide ideas and an outline for regulations concerning the recognition of opposition faction status, mechanisms for allocating leadership in special committees (pansus) and working committees (panja), procedures for recording minority reports, the right to submit counter-drafts, the right to request delays in discussions on certain objects, as well as budgetary incentive schemes for the research units of opposition factions. The primary focus is to make opposition participation truly "meaningful participation"—that is, participation that has access to resources, access to the process, and a formal paper trail, thereby enabling it to influence policy outcomes. If the doctrine of meaningful participation with the formulation of the right to be heard, right to be considered, and the right to be explained for the public is proposed to guarantee that the public can participate in democratic lawmaking with the assurance of being heard and considered, and must be provided with an explanation if their aspirations are not accepted, then factions within the DPR that are not part of the governing coalition—i.e., the opposition—should have clear and meaningful strengthening of their opposition rights so they can influence the entire process of the DPR's functions, more specifically in this article, the lawmaking process.

Furthermore, this article also elaborates on the idea and fact that a formal opposition within parliament is insufficient to function effectively within a power-balancing framework, especially against an oversized government-supporting coalition. Informal opposition originating from extra-parliamentary forces is also needed to strengthen this power-balancing process. Therefore, this article elaborates on how the formal opposition in the DPR is expected to cooperate with the extra-parliamentary opposition. Suppose the public has the right to participate meaningfully through these three rights. In that case, the opposition in the DPR is expected to act as an agent for aggregating and advocating for public aspirations and even objections regarding a bill that has significant constitutional implications, a broad societal impact, or causes public controversy.

2. Research Question

A central challenge in Indonesia's current political landscape is the absence of a strong and institutionalized opposition within the DPR. Although the 1945 Constitution mandates the DPR to perform checks and balances on the executive through its legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions, in practice, these functions have experienced significant erosion due to the dominance of a fat coalition. This dynamic of an excessively broad coalition fosters a culture of acclamation without substantive critique and deliberative debate, where the DPR more frequently functions as a tool for the swift legitimization of executive initiatives rather than as a forum for meaningful deliberation. The lack of formal recognition for the opposition has resulted in legislative processes that are shallow, exclusive, and ultimately undemocratic.

This article departs from the argument that the institutional void concerning opposition rights is a structural factor behind the strengthening of undemocratic lawmaking practices in Indonesia. Without guaranteed space for dissent, mechanisms for minority reports, the right to propose counter-bills, or the authority to delay discussions on controversial bills, the opposition is trapped as merely a symbol of rejection, rather than a deliberative actor capable of substantive contributions. Consequently, laws are often enacted without adequate debate, effective oversight, or meaningful public participation, thereby reducing the quality of legislation and weakening democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, the undemocratic lawmaking process produces legal products that are more oriented towards the interests of specific groups and oligarchies rather than the interests of the people themselves.

To address this democratic deficit, this article proposes the idea of institutionalizing the Right of Opposition within the framework of the MD3 Law, the P3 Law, and the DPR's internal regulations. By establishing opposition rights—such as leadership in legislative apparatus, procedural guarantees in discussions, and research support through incentive schemes—the legislative process can be redirected towards more inclusive, accountable, and transparent practices. Thus, there are three main problems this article seeks to answer: first, how has the absence of an institutionalized opposition contributed to undemocratic lawmaking in Indonesia?; second, how can the institutionalization of opposition rights in the MD3 Law, the P3 Law, and the DPR's internal regulations serve as a practical pathway to strengthen the democratic lawmaking process?; and third, how can an institutionalized opposition within the DPR collaborate with extra-parliamentary opposition?

3. Research Method

This article employs a socio-legal method that focuses not only on a normative-doctrinal analysis of the existing legal framework but also examines the socio-political contextual problem (law in context) of how law can be effectively designed and implemented within a political practice undergoing democratic regression and even causing constitutional damage. From the normative side, this research analyzes the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 17 of 2014 (MD3 Law), Law Number 12 of 2011 (P3 Law) and its amendments, as well as DPR Regulations on Standing Orders, to examine the absence of a legal basis that explicitly recognizes and institutionalizes the right of opposition. Furthermore, a policy research analysis is used to formulate a normative design for the institutionalization of opposition rights within the framework of democratic lawmaking according to the prevailing socio-political context.

The research begins with a conceptual analysis of the constitutional framework, the issue of opposition, and undemocratic lawmaking in Indonesia, leading to the assumption that undemocratic lawmaking in Indonesia occurs due to a weak opposition as a result of co-optation by a fat coalition. The idea of institutionalizing rights and incentives for the opposition in the MD3 Law, P3 Law, and DPR regulations then follows this stage. Subsequently, an analysis is also conducted on how an institutionalized opposition within the DPR can cooperate with extra-parliamentary opposition, as the experience of many countries shows that opposition within parliament is insufficient and must collaborate with extra-parliamentary opposition.

Research data primarily consist of legal documents such as constitutional texts, laws, and DPR regulations, as well as academic literature in the form of books, journal articles, and previous research that form the basis for normative analysis. All data are analyzed qualitatively using descriptive analysis and prescriptive modelling to propose institutional reform through the concept of the Right of Opposition and an incentive scheme for the opposition, as well as a model for cooperation between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition.

4. Constitutional Framework, the Issue of Opposition, and Undemocratic Lawmaking in Indonesia

Contemporary literature on opposition reveals that it is not a monolithic entity but rather a spectrum influenced by strategy, position, and its relationship with the ruling regime. The author interprets opposition as articulated by Eep Saifullah Fatah: opposition is not merely an adversary "an sich", nor is it simply a party that expresses disagreement; it is not a group or party that only shouts aimlessly, nor is it a faction that blindly resists power. Furthermore, the author also concurs with Nurcholis Madjid's statement that in a healthy democracy, checks and balances are essential as monitoring and balancing forces, because, from a philosophical viewpoint, human beings cannot always be right. In this context, Nurcholis Madjid stated that opposition does not always mean only "to oppose", but also contains "to support", as the concept of opposition embodies a spirit of loyalty—loyalty to the state, loyalty to shared ideals, and even loyalty to a good government that performs its functions correctly. Herein lies the understanding that opposition does not always signify mere "oppositionalism", which is solely about opposing, resisting, and being different.

Aligning with the two previous opinions, Tom Louwerse & Elina Zorina state that opposition has three main roles in a democracy: oversight, cooperation, and alternative. The oversight role emphasizes the opposition's function to critically monitor and supervise government actions, ensuring accountability without holding direct power over governance. Next, the cooperation role reveals the constructive side of the opposition by working together with the government to achieve compromises and produce policies, something more prominent in consensual or proportional democratic systems. Meanwhile, the alternative role functions to provide alternative policies or offer an alternative government in the next election, most evident in majoritarian systems like the United Kingdom, where the main opposition is seen as a future government-in-waiting, for example, through the "shadow cabinet" mechanism. These three roles essentially affirm the dual face of opposition: the conflictual side through oversight and alternative, and the cooperative side through cooperation.

Furthermore, opposition in the Indonesian context is, in essence, an authentic interpretation of the 1945 Constitution after the amendments, which position the parliament, particularly the DPR, as an institution tasked with performing checks and balances. This is precisely because the experience of governance regimes under the 1945 Constitution, prior to the amendments, both under Sukarno's Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin) in the Old Order regime and Suharto's New Order regime, rendered the DPR familiar only with the word "agree." Therefore, the post-reform experience in the last 5-10 years, especially under President Joko Widodo's leadership and in the early years of President Prabowo Subianto's leadership, which formed a fat coalition, has eliminated this checks-and-balances function of the DPR.

Therefore, formalizing opposition within Indonesia's state institutional design is not a taboo. Even if some argue that opposition only exists in parliamentary systems, making Indonesia's presidential system unsuitable for it, Elliot Bulmer, in his writing "Opposition and Legislative Minorities: Constitutional Roles, Rights, and Recognition", has shown that opposition exists in all systems of government—parliamentary, presidential, and mixed/hybrid. Additionally, the author holds the argument that opposition aligns with Indonesian Pancasila Democracy, based on the argument of Hatta, the founder of the nation and a framer of the first Constitution (the 1945 Constitution), who postulated that authentic Indonesian democracy originates from village democracy with three main characteristics: the ideal of "rapat" (deliberation or "musyawarah"), the ideal of "gotong-royong" (mutual cooperation), and the ideal of "masa protes" (protest). Specifically, the ideal of "masa protes" refers to the people's right to oppose unjust rules through traditions like "pepe openly"—sunbathing to convey aspirations in Majapahit—or "tapa-pepe" in the royal square (alun-alun keraton), as well as Bugis traditions such as "Manganro ri ade" (the right to petition); "Mapputane" (the right to object and negotiate with rulers); "Mallimpo-ade" (the right to occupy/sit-in); "Mabbarata" (the right to hold mass gatherings); and even "Malle-ke' dapureng" (the right to seek political asylum in another land). Herein, the right of opposition is inherently ingrained in Indonesian tradition. Consequently, directing Indonesian Pancasila Democracy solely towards the aspects of "musyawarah" and "gotong-royong" while excluding the ideal of protest is an ahistorical form and a distortion of Indonesia's authentic democratic tradition.

Beyond the Indonesian context, it is also necessary to note two important typologies widely used in recent studies: intra- and extra-parliamentary opposition as discussed by Gamboa, and in-system and non-system opposition as explained by Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson. Gamboa emphasises the strategies employed by the opposition in the face of democratic decline. She distinguishes between intra-parliamentary opposition, which operates through institutional channels such as parliament, elections, and courts. These opposition actors utilize official procedures to delay, modify, or reject government policies, thus providing democratic legitimacy to the political process. Conversely, extra-parliamentary opposition operates outside formal institutions, for example, through social movements, protests, boycott campaigns, or public mobilization. Extra-parliamentary strategies can exert strong pressure on the government, but they risk weakening democratic legitimacy itself if they become radical. According to Gamboa, the effectiveness of opposition in safeguarding democracy lies in its ability to combine both forms, strengthening formal channels while mobilizing public support outside parliament.

Meanwhile, Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson view opposition from its position relative to the regime. They distinguish between in-system and non-system opposition. In-system opposition is officially permitted to operate within the state's formal framework. They can contest elections, win seats in parliament, and sometimes even enjoy certain accommodations from the dominant regime. However, in-system opposition often faces a dilemma: how to maintain a critical image in the public eye while demonstrating sufficient loyalty to avoid being excluded from the formal arena. In contrast, non-system opposition comprises actors excluded from the formal political space. They lack access to parliament or competitive elections, so their struggle occurs more through extra-parliamentary action, mobilization, or resistance outside institutional frameworks.

These two typologies converge. Intra-parliamentary opposition in Gamboa's framework aligns with in-system opposition in Armstrong et al.'s framework, as both rely on official channels. Conversely, extra-parliamentary opposition can be paired with non-system opposition, as both operate outside the formal arena, albeit with potentially differing intensities and goals. The fundamental difference, according to Gamboa, lies in his emphasis on the strategy dimension (how opposition acts), while Armstrong et al. emphasize the position dimension (the extent to which opposition is accommodated or excluded by the regime).

In the Indonesian context, opposition has historically not been formally institutionalized in the Constitution or laws. The 1945 Constitution does not regulate the existence of opposition as a recognized political institution. The configuration of opposition is determined more by post-election political practices and coalition dynamics. For instance, the PDI-P played an opposition role during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's era (2004-2014), the Gerindra Party against President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009-2014) and President Joko Widodo (2014-2019), and the PKS took an opposition stance during President Joko Widodo's era (2014-2024), albeit with limited bargaining power. Similarly, other parties have not consistently been in full opposition; they have also been part of the government coalition, even when the President was not from their party.

Now, in the Prabowo–Gibran era (2024-2029), opposition is increasingly fragmented. The PDI-P, which initially had the standing of an opposition, is now showing signs of co-optation with its declaration that it is not opposition but a "government balancer." Based on this experience, the phenomenon of the fat coalition, which absorbs almost all parties into the government's ranks, has shrunk the space for intra-parliamentary opposition. Nevertheless, opposition still holds a symbolic role as a political alternative and a potential for future resistance.

It is noteworthy that the fat-coalition phenomenon, which has absorbed nearly all parties into the government's ranks, has significantly reduced the space for intra-parliamentary opposition. Within Armstrong et al.'s framework, Indonesian opposition is classified as in-system opposition because it remains present in parliament but lacks effective institutional tools. From Gamboa's perspective, opposition in Indonesia is also limited in maximizing institutional strategies because regulations like the MD3 Law, P3 Law, and DPR Standing Orders do not provide mechanisms for minority reports, counter-bills, or the right to delay discussions. Consequently, opposition is often marginalized, both in in-system and intra-parliamentary strategies, and can only channel resistance through extra-parliamentary actions that have little influence on the substance of legislation.

This condition underscores the urgency of institutionalizing opposition rights within the Indonesian legal system. Through formal recognition via the MD3 Law, P3 Law, and DPR regulations, opposition will gain a clear institutional space to perform its control function, particularly in the lawmaking process. This institutionalization would allow opposition in Indonesia to move beyond a merely symbolic position and become a force that tangibly contributes to democratic lawmaking through a more balanced combination of intra- and extra-parliamentary strategies.

5. Institutionalizing the Right of Opposition as an Effort to Strengthen Democratic Lawmaking

5.1 The Obligation of Faction Standing in the MD3 Law and Its Implications for Opposition Rights

As previously mentioned, a primary issue in Indonesia's political system is the lack of formal recognition of opposition within parliament. The MD3 Law only regulates the existence of factions as representations of political parties in the DPR but does not obligate factions to declare their position, whether within the government-supporting coalition or assuming the role of opposition. Consequently, the political configuration in the DPR is often fluid, unclear, and susceptible to change based on short-term interests. This situation creates an accountability problem, as the public cannot clearly identify who supports government policies and who acts as a monitor or counterbalance.

To address this issue, a provision can be formulated in the MD3 Law requiring each faction to publicly declare its political standing at the beginning of the DPR's term. This provision would mandate every faction to choose whether to be part of the government-supporting coalition or to declare itself as opposition. This declaration would be recorded in the DPR's official documents and made public.

In this regard, an expansion of Article 82 of the MD3 Law, which regulates Factions in the DPR, can be formulated. The current Article 82 insufficiently regulates that: (i) a faction is a grouping of members based on the political configuration from general election results; (ii) every DPR member must be a member of a faction; (iii) factions are formed by political parties meeting the vote threshold for determining DPR seats; (iv) factions are formed to optimize the implementation of the DPR's functions, authority, duties, and the rights and obligations of DPR members; (v) factions are supported by a secretariat and expert staff. Instead, it also needs to stipulate that: (i) each faction must declare itself as either a government supporter (coalition) or outside the government (opposition); and (ii) factions declaring themselves outside the government (opposition) possess opposition rights, including: (a) the right to hold leadership positions in DPR apparatus; (b) special rights in the process of discussing laws, budgets, and oversight; (c) strengthened immunity rights; (d) the right to receive research funding and expert support; and (e) the right to receive state recognition/awards. To prevent the government from "hoarding" support for its own parties, a maximum limit for government-supporting coalition factions and opposition factions must be established. Learning from India's experience, which mandates a minimum of 10% of seats to form an opposition, Indonesia could stipulate a minimum of 5% of seats, considering the practice of parties gaining less than 10% of seats.

Such regulation has several strategic objectives. First, it clarifies the political identity of factions so the public knows their position regarding government policies. Second, it creates institutional certainty for the opposition, as their status is officially recognized in law. Third, it forms the basis for granting special rights to the opposition, which was institutionalized in the MD3 Law, DPR Regulations, and the P3 Law, specifically concerning opposition rights in the lawmaking process. Fourth, it prevents a DPR entirely without opposition, which could potentially paralyze the DPR's ability to perform its checks and balances function.

5.2 The Right to Lead DPR's Organizational Bodies

A strategic right that needs institutionalization for the opposition is the opportunity to lead DPR organizational bodies that are directly or indirectly related to the legislative function. DPR organizational bodies directly related to the legislative function include the Legislation Body (Baleg)—which functions to formulate agreements on law planning in the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) with the President and DPD, harmonize, consolidate, and finalize draft laws proposed by members, commissions, or joint commissions, provide consideration on draft laws, discuss, amend, and refine draft laws, and evaluate the discussion of law substance in commissions or special committees. Furthermore, directly related to the legislative function are working committees (panja) formed specifically within commissions to discuss draft laws, and special committees (pansus) formed across commissions for draft laws whose substance requires cross-commission discussion. Also importantly related is the DPR Leadership, as law discussions at the Second Level Discussion or Plenary session, the highest decision-making level, are led directly by the DPR Leadership.

Currently, leadership seats in the DPR's Leadership, commissions, the Legislation Body, and working committees and special committees are distributed based on the proportion of the government coalition's political strength, as determined by leadership packages or the number of DPR seats obtained. This condition causes factions outside the government with few seats (minority) or those not invited into the leadership package proposal for DPR apparatus to be unable to sit in the DPR Leadership, commission leadership, Legislation Body, or working committees and special committees discussing draft laws. Consequently, the opposition becomes merely complementary and is rarely given strategic positions. However, leadership in these organizational bodies at the DPR determines access to the discussion agenda, time allocation, priority of bills discussed, and plays a crucial role in ensuring objections or minority notes are duly considered. In several cases, interruptions and objections from members or factions are often ignored by the DPR Leadership, which is fully controlled by the government-supporting coalition.

By granting leadership rights to opposition factions in certain DPR organisational bodies, such as the Legislation Body (Baleg), commissions that frequently discuss sectoral bills, or even in special committees and working committees for bill discussions, the opposition's position becomes more than just a critical party. They can function as an internal counterbalance with the authority to control meeting proceedings, determine agendas, and ensure process transparency. Furthermore, this mechanism becomes a significant incentive for political parties to opt out of the coalition without fearing a loss of access to strategic positions in the DPR.

In other democratic practices, such as those in the UK, the opposition is given a role to lead oversight committees through the shadow cabinet concept, thereby maintaining a balance of power. For this to apply in Indonesia, the idea needs to be formulated in provisions of the MD3 Law or DPR regulations on standing orders, for example, by establishing leadership quotas for opposition factions or implementing a leadership rotation system if the number of opposition factions is limited. Thus, the right to leadership not only serves as an accountability mechanism but also as an institutional incentive, encouraging political parties to choose the opposition path instead of joining a large coalition for short-term interests. Ultimately, institutionalizing a similar principle in Indonesia will strengthen the quality of democratic lawmaking, as the legislative process is no longer monopolized by the majority coalition but actively involves the opposition in institutional leadership. Therefore, the right to lead DPR organizational bodies for the opposition is not just about power distribution but a mechanism to guarantee substantive deliberation, transparency, and political balance in law formation.

5.3 Rights in the Discussion of Bills

Regarding the discussion of bills initiated by the President, the opposition's position in the DPR needs to be strengthened through mechanisms that prioritise their critical views. One step that can be regulated is the obligation for the Problem Inventory List (DIM) submitted by opposition factions to be discussed first before the DIM from coalition factions or the government. This mechanism aims to ensure the opposition's voice is not drowned out by the majority, while also providing space for alternative views to influence the discussion direction from the early stages.

Besides priority in the discussion order, the opposition also needs to be allocated longer time to elaborate arguments, propose improvements, and defend their objections. This additional time is crucial because the opposition often presents critical counterarguments to executive draft policies. With more time, the opposition can test the substance's feasibility, highlight social or constitutional impacts, and offer alternative policy options.

Meanwhile, for bills initiated by the DPR itself, it is essential to design an institutionalised mechanism that obligates the discussion of notes and objections raised by opposition factions before proceeding to other substantive discussions. Thus, opposition objections are not treated as mere formalities but as priority issues that must be tested in the legislative forum.

If these objections or notes from the opposition are not heard, not seriously considered, or ultimately not accepted, then the opposition has the right to formalize them in an official objection note or "Minderheidsnota" (Minority Report). This note becomes a formal document accompanying the bill's journey, allowing the public to know that significant disagreements existed in the legislative process clearly.

Furthermore, in meetings discussing DPR-initiated bills, opposition factions must also be given space to openly state that an article or provision is not fully agreed upon. This note is recorded in the official minutes, not merely becoming a minority view lost in political compromise. This mechanism not only strengthens transparency but also maintains deliberation quality by ensuring differing voices are documented and become part of the legislative record.

Such regulation not only affirms the opposition's role as a counterbalance in the legislative process but also serves as a democratic instrument to strengthen deliberation quality. By prioritising and expanding opposition discussion in bill deliberations, the DPR can ensure that the legislative process truly reflects the principles of openness, meaningful participation, and respect for diverse political views.

5.4 The Right to Delay or Slow Down the Legislative Process

Additionally, the opposition needs to be equipped with the formal right to propose a delay or slowing down of the legislative process. In current DPR practice, bill discussions are often conducted at a fast pace, especially for bills deemed strategic by the government and the majority coalition. This fast-track legislation pattern often draws public criticism for ignoring public participation, reducing debate quality, and weakening the legitimacy of legislative outcomes. The right to delay or slow down the legislative process applies particularly to bills with important constitutional content, broad societal impact (such as on taxes, criminal law, or those burdening the state budget), and those generating widespread public controversy and rejection.

Institutionalising the right to delay allows opposition factions to request additional time before the discussion stage proceeds, especially for bills with significant constitutional content, broad societal impact, or those causing widespread controversy and public rejection. This right is not intended to obstruct legislation but serves as a democratic mechanism for more careful discussion, providing space for additional public consultation, and opening opportunities for more in-depth policy impact studies.

An institutionalized delay mechanism would strengthen the principle of meaningful participation by allowing the public to understand, respond to, and critique the bill's substance. This expands the space for the public's right to be heard and considered by the lawmaker. Furthermore, this right simultaneously becomes an incentive for the opposition to play a constructive role in deepening the quality of deliberation without straying from the institutional path. Thus, the right to delay not only protects democracy from fast-track legislative practices but also strengthens the opposition's position as an essential actor in the development of democratic lawmaking in Indonesia.

5.5 The Right to Propose a Counterbill

The opposition's right to propose a counterbill is an important instrument to ensure the legislative process is not dominated solely by majority logic but also opens space for different policy alternatives. In current DPR practice, bills initiated by the President or the DPR itself are often processed quickly without any formal counter-document. Consequently, the opposition's voice only exists in the form of reactive notes or rejections, not in the form of substantive proposals that can be debated on equal footing with the official draft.

With the right to a counterbill, opposition factions can propose alternative drafts for specific bills, whether they originate from the President or the DPR. This counterbill serves as an official legislative document that must be discussed in conjunction with the main draft. For example, if the President proposes a bill on labor, the opposition can prepare a counter version reflecting different views on labor protection, industrial relations, or dispute resolution mechanisms. Similarly, for DPR-initiated bills, opposition factions can submit alternative drafts to show that other policy options exist that are more democratic, rational, or aligned with public aspirations.

Institutionalizing the counterbill will encourage legislative debates to become more substantive, as coalition factions and the government face not only criticism but also complete and systematic normative drafts. This mechanism also improves legislation quality, as each draft law must be comprehensively tested against the proposed alternative. Moreover, the right to a counterbill provides a positive incentive for the opposition to play a constructive role—instead of merely rejecting, they are encouraged to offer legal solutions that can be debated within the framework of formal deliberation. Thus, institutionalizing the right to propose a counterbill not only strengthens the opposition's position as a counterbalance but also ensures that democratic lawmaking truly presents diverse, transparent policy choices rooted in inclusive political participation.

5.6 The Right to Research Budget Incentives and Expert Support

The right for the opposition to receive special budget incentives for research and expert support is a crucial instrument enabling the opposition to perform its legislative function effectively and on par with the majority coalition. Currently, resource limitations often cause opposition factions to lose out in preparing in-depth analyses, alternative academic papers, or data-based arguments during bill discussions. This results in opposition criticism tending to be normative and lacking the technical weight to counter government or coalition arguments.

Through clear regulation in the MD3 Law or DPR Regulations, opposition factions should have the right to adequate research budget allocation. This budget could be used to fund policy studies, prepare academic papers for counterbills, or conduct in-depth reviews of draft laws submitted by the executive or the DPR itself. Additionally, the opposition must be given flexibility to use these funds to collaborate with experts, universities, independent research institutions, or civil society organizations. This way, the quality of opposition input would not be merely rhetorical but based on strong research and empirical evidence.

Such budgetary incentives are not a privilege but a democratic mechanism to ensure meaningful participation. Without adequate research support, the opposition will remain structurally weak. With research incentives, the opposition can not only critique draft laws but also offer rational, comprehensive policy alternatives aligned with societal needs. Ultimately, institutionalizing this right will strengthen democratic lawmaking in Indonesia by ensuring debates in the DPR are truly supported by an academic basis and broader public participation.

The table below illustrates the regulation of factional roles in the legislative process as stipulated in the MD3 Law, the P3 Law, the DPR Regulation on Rules of Procedure, and the DPR Regulation on Lawmaking. From these legal frameworks, it can be concluded that the rights of opposition factions are essentially not distinguished from those of coalition factions. All factions, whether they support or oppose the government, are granted equal space in the lawmaking process—for instance, in presenting their views, submitting brief statements, proposing a list of issues (DIM), and expressing approval or rejection in plenary sessions.

Nevertheless, this formal equality also highlights the institutional limitations of the opposition in Indonesia. The absence of differentiation between opposition and coalition means that the legal framework does not explicitly design the opposition as a distinct body with an oversight and counterbalance function vis-à-vis the executive. In other words, the opposition operates only within the same procedural framework as the coalition factions, without structural guarantees that would strengthen its role as a countervailing power in parliament. This condition explains why, in practice, the effectiveness of the opposition depends more on political dynamics, factional solidarity, and the configuration of power within the DPR, rather than on normative arrangements in the legislation.

6. Cooperation Between Intra- and Extra-Parliamentary Opposition

The phenomenon of democratic erosion often occurs gradually, providing space for the opposition to resist if it can develop an appropriate strategy. Gamboa emphasizes that this condition gives the opposition sufficient time and opportunity to respond to the weakening of democracy. Therefore, a pattern of cooperation between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition becomes crucial to prevent the consolidation of executive power that is potentially authoritarian.

Intra-parliamentary opposition plays a role by optimizing institutional strategies aimed at moderate goals. This strategy keeps the conflict resolution process within institutional channels and opens space for negotiation, thus protecting the opposition from government repressive efforts. Its forms can include utilizing legislative procedures to slow down, amend, or weaken policy drafts, while also using judicial channels and oversight institutions to curb anti-democratic steps.

Meanwhile, extra-parliamentary opposition can complement this with moderate non-violent strategies. Public mobilisation, boycott actions, and peaceful demonstrations become crucial instruments for increasing pressure on the government while providing moral support for the opposition within parliament. In the context of Colombia, such actions were even able to prompt judicial institutions to make decisions that hindered the executive's efforts to expand its power.

However, the experience of Venezuela shows that radical strategies such as coups, unlimited strikes, or election boycotts can backfire on the opposition itself. These actions actually weaken the opposition's credibility and provide legitimacy for the government to eliminate political opponents and strengthen its control over state institutions. Therefore, cooperation between intra- and extra-parliamentary opposition should be oriented towards moderate goals, not radical efforts to overthrow the executive immediately.

Harmony between opposition inside and outside parliament also requires consistency in political narrative. The opposition in Colombia demonstrated that using discourse that emphasises the protection of democracy and the cessation of anti-democratic policies, without directly demanding the president's downfall, can maintain legitimacy while expanding its support base. This proves the importance of cohesive political communication between these two arenas of opposition.

Ultimately, the success of this cooperation pattern depends not only on the opposition's strategy but also on support from society and the international community. Democratic institutions, no matter how strong and established, will not be able to survive without defense from citizens. The strength of public support for democratic institutions and external pressure from the international community will be crucial in determining the effectiveness of the opposition in halting the slide of democracy towards an authoritarian regime.

7. Implementation Challenges

Cooperation between in-system and non-system opposition in authoritarian regimes often operates in a push-and-pull dynamic. On one hand, pressure from their mass base pushes in-system opposition to take to the streets alongside non-system opposition, particularly on material issues such as inflation, wage payments, pensions, and economic crises. On the other hand, incentives from the regime constrain their room for maneuver, preventing them from getting too close to "radical" opposition. Armstrong et al. conclude by emphasizing that in-system opposition is not merely a tool of the regime but also an important actor that can determine the direction of political change.

The institutionalization of opposition rights within Indonesia's legislative system promises democratic strengthening, but its implementation faces several serious challenges. First, there are political obstacles stemming from the dominance of the fat coalition. Parties that choose to remain within the circle of power tend to reject the idea of strengthening the opposition, as it is perceived to reduce political stability and diminish access to resources and power distribution. This resistance makes institutional reform difficult to initiate from within the DPR itself.

Second, there are legal and institutional challenges, namely the absence of a normative foundation that explicitly recognizes the opposition in the 1945 Constitution or in organic laws. The MD3 Law, for instance, still emphasizes power proportionality mechanisms without providing clear room for differentiation between the coalition and the opposition. Consequently, the idea of opposition rights risks being interpreted as unconstitutional or contrary to the principle of equality among factions.

Third, there are challenges related to political culture. To date, opposition in Indonesia has often been viewed as a form of total rejection or disloyalty, rather than as a democratic mechanism for maintaining a balance of power. This stigma makes the idea of institutionalizing opposition difficult to accept, both by political elites and a segment of the public, who are more accustomed to accommodative politics and pragmatic compromise.

Fourth, there are technical and administrative challenges. Implementing opposition rights, such as the right to delay discussions, propose counter-bills, or lead legislative apparatus, requires detailed technical rules to prevent them from turning into obstructionist practices or slowing down the overall performance of the DPR. This requires a regulatory design that strikes a balance between accommodating the opposition and maintaining legislative effectiveness.

Fifth, in certain instances, particularly concerning draft laws that would affect oligarchic or specific power interests, there is a significant possibility of undue pressure, such as intimidation of individuals or institutions, including the use of law enforcement tools to threaten the opposition. Therefore, strengthening the opposition in the legislative field is not sufficient merely through budgetary incentives and expert support; it may also require security protection and a commitment to avoid frivolous targeting, considering the potential for the criminalisation of the opposition on trivial matters. Hence, strengthening immunity rights and a collective commitment to the opposition's stance becomes crucial.

From this exposition, the institutionalisation of opposition rights to strengthen democratic lawmaking faces a complexity of political, legal, cultural, and technical challenges. However, it is precisely by acknowledging these challenges that reform can be designed realistically, whether through amendments to the MD3 Law, the drafting of DPR regulations, or changes in political culture, so that the opposition can function as a substantive counterbalance without disrupting legislative effectiveness.

8. Conclusion

The absence of formal recognition and institutionalization of opposition rights in Indonesia's constitutional system has led to legislative practices that tend to be undemocratic. The DPR, which should be an arena for substantive deliberation, is instead trapped in the logic of a fat coalition, often marginalizing critical and alternative voices. Consequently, the legislative process loses its control function, lacks meaningful participation, and often produces laws of questionable quality.

This article affirms that the solution to this democratic deficit lies in the institutionalization of the Right of Opposition within the MD3 Law and the DPR's internal regulations. With clear regulations regarding faction standing, the right to lead legislative apparatus, priority in discussing the Problem Inventory List (DIM), mechanisms for Minority Reports (Minderheidsnota), the right to delay, the submission of counter-bills, as well as support for research funding and expert staff, the opposition will have real capacity to act as a counterbalance to power. Additionally, the potential for security protection and a commitment to upholding the immunity rights of opposition members in the DPR is also necessary. This reform is not intended to weaken political stability but rather to strengthen deliberative democracy and ensure that the lawmaking process is inclusive, transparent, and accountable.

The institutionalization of opposition rights is certainly not free from various challenges, be they political, legal, cultural, or technical. However, with careful regulatory design and adequate incentives, opposition rights can be operationalized without sacrificing the DPR's effectiveness. Furthermore, this step will become a crucial instrument for building democratic lawmaking in Indonesia, where differing views are not seen as a threat but as a prerequisite for a healthy and sustainable democracy. Thus, the institutionalization of the Right of Opposition is an urgent agenda for improving legislative governance in Indonesia. It is a bridge to restoring the DPR's function as a representative institution that truly fulfils its constitutional mandate: not merely as a rubber-stamp for the executive, but as an open deliberative forum reflecting the diversity of Indonesian societal aspirations. Moreover, the opposition should not be confined to within parliament (DPR); it must be connected to extra-parliamentary opposition, so that the resonance of public voices can be channelled through effective cooperation, resulting in a democratic lawmaking process that serves the interests of the people and the public, and prevents the damaging dominance of oligarchy.