Building People's Democracy in Legislation: Structural Analysis and Political Power in Indonesia

1. Introduction

Democracy is essentially a government by the people, for the people, and of the people. In general, democracy is a form of communal life, both in relation to the nation and society, and in accordance with the worldview of the nation or other worldviews desired by people living in communities. The implementation of democratic government has mainstreamed the existence of supreme sovereignty in the hands of the people. However, this does not mean that the community takes control of the government, but rather that the people participate by electing their representatives in the executive and legislative branches of government, and their will is realized through general elections. So, in its authority to administer the government, the government cannot arbitrarily make decisions or issue guidelines, but must also consult and discuss accountability with the people.¹

In a democracy, all actions must be in accordance with the conscience and wishes of the people. Furthermore, in the context of democracy, the voice of the people is the voice of God (vox populi vox dei). This means that the people are the absolute holders of power, the people are the holders of sovereignty, while leaders or presidents are the executors of power entrusted to them by the people.² However, the legislative process in Indonesia still faces structural challenges where the reality of power imbalances is evident in the contrast between the legislative and executive branches, political parties, and civil society. This balance of power prioritizes the interests of the House of Representatives, the government, and political parties over the aspirations of the people in determining the direction of politics. As a result, the people are marginalized in terms of participation, which is limited, so that the legitimacy of legislation related to citizen participation is often questioned.

The political history of Indonesia shows that the democratic model that developed after the Reformation tended to follow the pattern of liberal democracy, with an emphasis on proceduralism, regular elections, and the protection of individual rights. However, liberal democracy often fails to achieve social justice because public participation is merely a formality and is easily controlled by capital forces or political oligarchies.³ On the other hand, Indonesia's constitutional ideals call for a more substantive democracy, namely a people's democracy in which public participation is not only viewed from a procedural perspective, but also as genuine participation in the formulation of public policy. A people's democracy requires a forum for deliberation that allows the public to directly influence the direction of legislation, rather than merely being the subject of policy.

The bureaucracy, which should be a tool for policy implementation, is often trapped in practices of patrimonialism, inefficiency, and resistance to public participation. This situation undermines the quality of democracy because public policy is controlled more by the interests of the elite than by the needs of the people. Bureaucratic reform efforts are essential to ensure that the legislative process becomes more transparent, inclusive, and responsive to the aspirations of the people.

In the concept of volonté générale, Rousseau emphasizes that laws are only valid if they arise from the general will of society, while Habermas emphasizes the importance of the public sphere as an arena for rational deliberation to build political legitimacy.⁴ However, John Stuart Mill warned of the dangers of majority tyranny, when the dominant voice oppresses minority groups and marginalizes diverse aspirations. This analysis shows that popular democracy is more important than mere procedural liberal democracy because popular democracy guarantees substantive participation, fair representation, and protection of vulnerable groups. Popular democracy also functions as political education, where active involvement in public discussions and the legislative process fosters critical awareness and collective responsibility and strengthens the relationship between the state and its citizens. Thus, popular democracy is one way to achieve substantive justice and prevent oligarchic power and majority opinion, which often negate the very meaning of democracy itself.

On the other hand, liberal philosophers such as John Locke and Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized the importance of individual rights as the foundation of democracy. Locke viewed democracy as a social contract that protects individual freedom, while Tocqueville emphasized that modern democracy is supported by political institutions, particularly elections, as the main means for society to exercise its sovereignty. However, the dominance of this view often results in democracy being limited to electoral and procedural mechanisms, thereby tending to neglect significant public participation in determining political direction. This is why participatory democracy is so important: participatory democracy not only protects individual rights, but also guarantees collective participation in the political process, so that politics truly emerges from the aspirations of the people and is not merely the result of compromises between political elites or the ruling majority.

Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct legislation in a more democratic manner by integrating the principles of people's democracy, protection of social rights, and substantive justice. A deliberative model of legislation is important to ensure that public policy favors the interests of the wider community, while also affirming the shift from liberal democracy to people's democracy rooted in the constitutional mandate and collective aspirations of the nation.

This study uses a normative-qualitative approach, focusing on the analysis of legal documents and political theory, to examine the dynamics of democracy in the legislative process in Indonesia. Primary data was obtained from the Constitution, laws governing legislation, and regulations. Critical discourse analysis was used to examine the power relations between the executive, legislature, political parties, and bureaucracy, as well as to assess the extent to which the principles of popular and deliberative democracy are integrated into legislative practice. The theoretical framework of popular will, public space, and the tyranny of the majority is used as an analytical tool to examine the gap between constitutional norms and political reality. The aim is to map the structural deficits of democracy and to redesign legislation to be more inclusive and substantive.

2. Discussion and Analysis

The Structure of Power in Indonesian Legislation

Since independence, Indonesia's founding fathers have officially chosen a new form of government and abandoned the monarchy system. Therefore, the concept of royal sovereignty no longer needs to be discussed. Similarly, the concept of state sovereignty as commonly understood in the context of international relations also does not need to be questioned. This is because Indonesia simultaneously adheres to the principles of divine sovereignty, the rule of law, and popular sovereignty in accordance with the Staatsidee (state ideology) contained in the 1945 Constitution.⁵ However, the most crucial of these three types of sovereignty is the sovereignty of the people.

The principle of popular sovereignty is not only embodied in the laws and regulations it produces, but is also reflected in the structure and mechanisms of state and government institutions that guarantee the upholding of the legal system and the functioning of the democratic system. Institutionally, the principle of sovereignty is usually organized through two options, namely through a system of separation of powers or distribution or division of powers. The separation of powers is horizontal in nature, meaning that power is divided into functions that are reflected in state institutions that are equal and check and balance each other.⁶ Meanwhile, the division of power is vertical in the sense that power is distributed vertically downward to high state institutions under the institution that holds the sovereignty of the people. The pre-amended 1945 Constitution adhered to the concept of vertical division of power, rather than horizontal separation of powers. People's sovereignty is considered to be fully realized in the MPR, which can be interpreted as the highest institution or the highest forum. From here, certain functions are distributed as duties and authorities to the high state institutions below it, namely the President, the DPR, the Supreme Court, and so on.

Essentially, the principles of separation or division of powers are intended to limit the power of the state from becoming a source of oppression and arbitrary actions by those in power. The regulation and limitation of power is a characteristic of constitutionalism and the main task of the constitution, so that the possibility of arbitrary power can be controlled and minimized. As Lord Acton famously said, and as is often quoted by many writers, "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." This is the iron law of power which, if not controlled and limited according to constitutional procedures, can be a source of disaster. The morality of power should not be left solely to the intentions or personal characteristics of the person who happens to hold it. No matter how good a person is, power must still be regulated and limited, so that a person's goodness is not swallowed up by the iron law of power.

The development of Indonesian constitutional practice has always been perceived as having weaknesses in the implementation of the Indonesian government system based on the 1945 Constitution. The system of government adopted, in the eyes of experts, tends to be referred to as quasi-presidential or a mixed system in a negative connotation, because it is considered to contain many distortions when linked to a democratic system that requires a more effective mechanism of checks and balances between existing state institutions. Therefore, with the first four amendments to the 1945 Constitution, particularly with the adoption of a direct presidential election system and structural and functional changes to the People's Consultative Assembly, our system of government has become more clearly a presidential system.

The system of government of the Republic of Indonesia under the 1945 Constitution is actually intended to be a presidential system. Both in the explanation of the 1945 Constitution and in the general understanding that has developed so far, Indonesia does indeed adhere to a presidential system. However, here and there are ambiguities and overlapping provisions between the idealized presidential system and elements of a parliamentary system. The explanatory notes to the 1945 Constitution still use the term head of state, which is distinguished from the function of head of government. The Indonesian parliamentary structure still contains elements of a parliamentary system, as seen in the role and authority of the People's Consultative Assembly as the supreme body of the state (supreme body) that has the authority to elect the President and Vice President, is the place where the president is obliged to be accountable to the parliamentary institution, and also has the authority to dismiss the president at any time if the president is considered to have seriously violated the state's policy, which can be political in nature.⁷ All of these are elements of a parliamentary system within Indonesia's system of government, which is often referred to as a presidential system. Therefore, constitutional law experts tend to describe Indonesia's system of government based on the 1945 Constitution as quasi-presidential, rather than a presidential system in the true sense of the word.

The relationship between the President and Parliament, when viewed within the system of checks and balances, is one in which the President, as the head of the executive branch, has an equal but mutually controlling position with the Parliament as the holder of legislative power. In accordance with the presidential principle, the President cannot dissolve Parliament, but conversely, Parliament cannot remove the President from office. Parliament can only demand the removal of the President if the President is proven to have committed a violation of the law, and even then, it is usually limited by the constitution to only certain types of criminal acts, for example, in the United States Constitution, it is linked to treason, bribery and high crimes, as well as minor violations that can be categorized as misdemeanors. In a parliamentary system of government, parliament can easily dismiss the cabinet for political reasons, namely through a mechanism commonly referred to as a vote of no confidence in the cabinet's performance and government policy (beleids). This practice in a parliamentary system of government cannot be used as a reference in the presidential system that Indonesia wishes to develop.

In essence, the main functions of parliament are oversight and legislation. An additional function closely related to these two functions is the budgetary function. In carrying out the above two functions, parliament has a very strong position. The instruments that can be used by parliament to effectively carry out its supervisory function over the running of the government are (a) budgetary rights, (b) interpellation rights, (c) inquiry rights, (d) resolution proposal rights, (e) confirmation rights or the right to select certain official candidates. In addition to institutional rights, each individual member of parliament is also guaranteed the right to ask questions and submit opinions, as well as other rights such as immunity and protocol rights. All of these rights are important as instruments that can be used in carrying out the political oversight function of the government.

Political parties are also related to the issue of checks and balances. In a democracy, the position and role of each state institution must be equally strong and mutually controlling in a relationship of checks and balances. However, if these state institutions do not function properly, are ineffective, or lack authority in carrying out their respective functions, what often happens is that greedy or extreme political parties run rampant, dominating and controlling all processes of government administration.

However, in relation to state activities, the role of political parties as a medium and vehicle is certainly very prominent. In addition to other factors such as a free press and the role of an enlightened middle class, among others, the role of political parties can be said to be very decisive in the dynamics of state activities. Political parties play a very important role in the dynamic process of fighting for the values and interests of their constituents to determine policy in the context of state activities. Political parties act as intermediaries in the process of making state decisions, connecting citizens with state institutions. According to Robert Michels in his book, Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy, "Organizations are the only economic or political means of forming collective will."⁸

Looking at the situation in recent years, there are several policies passed by the government that are far from representing the people. Examples include the Job Creation Law, the Criminal Code Law, the State Ministry Law, the TNI Law, and others. The DPR, as the institution that makes laws, must understand the scale of priorities so that the people are represented, especially in the legislative process. Public participation is an important point in the legislative process. If this principle is not fulfilled, then it can be said that the law is not legally valid because the P3 principle, as stipulated in Law No. 12 of 2011, is the basis for the policy-making process. The enactment of laws that are far from public participation is a form of government arrogance in the interests of the oligarchy. The relationship between the DPR, the government, and political parties is key in determining the direction of state policy.

To overcome various potential problems, there should be a mechanism for party openness whereby members of the public outside the party can participate in determining the policies to be pursued through and by political parties. Political parties must be used as a means for the people to fight for their aspirations in determining how the state system works. Therefore, administrators should function as servants of the aspirations and interests of their constituents.

In the future, political party management should be directed towards becoming a professional management body that is separate and distinct from prospective representatives. It may be worth considering dividing political party management into three components, namely: (a) the representative cadre component; (b) the executive cadre component; and (c) the professional management component. The three components are regulated in a separate structure, and there should be no dual positions or multiple paths. Recruitment and promotion patterns must follow the path that has been determined in one of the three paths.

A good political party requires social space to grow, namely freedom of thought among fellow citizens who will channel their political aspirations through one of the main channels, namely political parties. Therefore, political parties and the DPR have a very important position (status) and role in every democratic system. Thus, the relationship between the government, the DPR, and political parties is crucial in determining the direction of future policies.

Bureaucracy and Legislation

Conceptually, bureaucracy is often understood as merely a neutral state administrative machine tasked with impartially executing the commands of the law. However, in modern political reality, this view is no longer sufficient to capture the complexity of its role. Bureaucracy has evolved into a strategic political actor, not only as an executor but also as the main architect in the formulation of public policy and the legislative process. They have information advantages, technical expertise, and resources that place them at the heart of the formulation of draft laws.⁹ Thus, the bureaucracy has a dual role: as an executor that obeys the law and as an initiator that actively shapes the content of the law itself.

In the context of Indonesia's presidential system, the strategic position of the bureaucracy is reinforced by the constitutional framework. The 1945 Constitution grants the President the right to submit bills to the House of Representatives (DPR), a right that in practice is exercised by ministries and non-ministerial government agencies (K/L).¹⁰ The government's position as the main initiator of legislation makes the bureaucracy the "kitchen" of national legislation. Unlike the parliamentary system, where the fusion of executive and legislative powers is more fluid, Indonesia's presidential system creates a unique dynamic in which the bureaucracy (as part of the executive) becomes the main supplier of academic papers and draft bills, which are then discussed with the DPR.

The bureaucracy's dominance in legislative initiation is not without reason. The government, through its bureaucratic apparatus, has technocratic capacities that far exceed those of the DPR as an institution. Each ministry has a directorate general, research agency, and experts who specifically master certain sectors, ranging from finance and energy to health. This capacity enables them to draft complex bills that are comprehensive and rich in technical details. As a result, the DPR often finds itself in a reactive position, discussing and correcting proposals that have already been finalized by the government, rather than drafting bills from scratch with its limited internal capacity.

On the one hand, the dominant role of the bureaucracy can strengthen the substance of democracy by producing high-quality, evidence-based legislation.¹¹ A professional bureaucracy can draft laws that are implementable, measurable, and technically address public issues. Processes led by experts are expected to minimize populist political intervention that may sacrifice long-term interests. In other words, the bureaucracy acts as a stabilizer, ensuring that legislation is based not only on momentary political will, but also on technical considerations and accurate data for the sake of government effectiveness.

However, on the other hand, this dominance has the potential to significantly hamper public participation and the substance of democracy. When the process of drafting bills is too centralized within closed bureaucratic spaces, it creates a significant distance from public aspirations. The bureaucracy can become trapped in its own sectoral interests, maintaining the status quo, or even facilitating the interests of certain elite groups who have access to circles of power. As a result, public participation often becomes a mere formality, where input from civil society, academics, or affected groups is not substantially integrated into the final draft of the bill, a phenomenon known as the "democratic deficit."

Data consistently shows the superiority of the government as the initiator of legislation. Research from various parliamentary monitoring institutions, such as the Indonesian Parliamentary Watch Forum (FORMAPPI), has repeatedly shown that more than 70% of the laws passed each year originate from government proposals. For example, in the 2023 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) Priority, of the 39 bills submitted, 26 were government proposals, while only 12 were DPR proposals and 1 was a DPD proposal.¹² This figure quantitatively proves that the majority of the national legislative agenda is determined by the executive, indicating how central the role of the bureaucracy is in the legislative cycle.

One of the most monumental examples of this dual role of the bureaucracy is the process of drafting the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law). This giant legislative project was entirely designed and led by the government bureaucracy through a special task force involving various ministries. Its extraordinary complexity, bringing together more than 70 laws, demonstrates the unmatched technocratic capacity of the bureaucracy. However, the process also became a symbol of the obstruction of public participation; many civil society groups and labor unions complained about the lack of meaningful involvement and the seemingly rushed process, which ultimately sparked a wave of widespread protests across the country.

Public participation mechanisms such as Public Hearings (RDPU) held by the House of Representatives are often insufficient to bridge this gap. Public involvement is often carried out at a late stage when the draft bill is almost final, leaving very limited room for substantial changes. The bureaucracy, arguing for efficiency and data confidentiality, may be reluctant to open up the process of drafting academic papers to the public from the outset. As a result, democracy only exists at the procedural level (consultations are held), but dies at the substantive level (input is not adopted), further eroding public trust in the legislative process.

To understand why the bureaucracy has such a central role, we must trace the structural foundations that legitimize its position in the legislative cycle. This power is not something informal or merely the result of political practices, but is deeply rooted in a legal foundation that explicitly grants authority to the executive branch. It is this legal framework that provides the formal entry point for the bureaucracy to not only participate in, but also dominate the stage of law formulation. Thus, an analysis of the formal position of the bureaucracy provides an understanding of how technocratic power is institutionalized and exercised within the Indonesian constitutional architecture.

The most fundamental legal basis for this authority is the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Specifically, Article 5 Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution states that "the President has the right to submit draft legislation to the People's Representative Council." This clause, although it refers to the President as the legal subject,¹³ In practice, this is fully delegated to the bureaucracy below him, namely ministries and government agencies. The president, as the head of the executive branch, acts through his aides to prepare and formulate every detail of the bills to be submitted. As a result, the bureaucracy is not merely an implementer of policy, but rather an extension of the president's constitutional authority in carrying out legislative functions.

This constitutional authority is then translated in a more technical and operational manner into the Law on the Formation of Legislation (PPP Law). This regulation serves as the "bible" for the legislative process in Indonesia, which regulates each stage in detail, from planning, drafting, and deliberation to ratification.¹⁴ The PPP Law formally institutionalizes the dominant role of the government by requiring the inclusion of an Academic Paper for most bills, a document whose drafting is almost exclusively the domain of the bureaucracy. Thus, the PPP Law not only regulates the process, but also effectively provides procedural legitimacy for the bureaucracy to control the initial substance of a legal product.

The most crucial stage at which the technocratic dominance of the bureaucracy is realized is during the drafting of the Academic Paper (NA). This document is a scientific justification that contains the philosophical, sociological, and juridical foundations regarding the urgency of a bill. The bureaucracy, with its unrivaled access to national statistical data, internal research results, and financial resources to hire experts and academics, is in a monopoly position to formulate the NA. This is where the direction, scope, and basic principles of a law are laid out, often before legislators in the DPR have had time to conduct an in-depth study of the issue at hand.

The process of drafting bills is the next arena in which the hegemony of the bureaucracy is further cemented. Once the conceptual framework has been agreed upon in the Academic Paper, legal drafters and technical experts in the initiating ministry or agency begin work on formulating each article and paragraph.¹⁵ This phase is highly technical and elitist, involving in-depth internal discussions on legal terminology, sanction mechanisms, and the authority of implementing agencies. The result of this process is a complete draft that reflects in detail the interests and vision of the relevant sectoral bureaucracy, which is then submitted to the DPR as the government's initial position that is difficult to fundamentally change.

When the government's proposed bill arrives at the DPR, the formal interaction mechanism begins, but with an unbalanced bargaining position. The government, represented by the relevant ministers and echelon I officials and experts from the bureaucracy, will face council members in a series of formal forums. This discussion process, starting from working meetings at the commission level to intensive discussions in working committees (panja), is procedurally designed to reach an agreement. However, because the government comes with much more thorough preparation—armed with thick academic papers and solid drafts—they often act as the party that is more "teaching" or explaining rather than negotiating as equals.

In working committee (panja) meetings, where discussions are conducted word by word and sentence by sentence, the superiority of the bureaucracy's technical mastery becomes very apparent. Members of the House of Representatives, who have a wide range of issues to deal with and limited expert staff, often find it difficult to match the depth of understanding of the government team, which has spent months or even years preparing the bill. As a result, debates often revolve around political issues or populist articles, while complex technical matters tend to be approved based on explanations and recommendations from the bureaucracy.

The legislative discussion structure also recognizes the institution of the List of Issues (DIM). Although the DIM is submitted by factions in the DPR in response to the government's draft, the process of filling it out and negotiating it once again places the bureaucracy in a central position. Each item on the DPR's DIM is answered and negotiated by a government team. In lobbying forums, which are often closed, arguments supported by data and technical analysis from the bureaucracy carry more weight, so it is not uncommon for proposed changes from the DPR to be rejected on technocratic grounds that are difficult for politicians to refute.

Thus, this structural analysis shows that the position of the bureaucracy in Indonesia's legislative cycle is strengthened by a series of formal and systematic rules. From the mandate of the constitution, the details of the procedures in the PPP Law, to the practices of deliberation in parliament, all contribute to the institutionalization of the dominant role of the bureaucracy. This structure creates a system in which the government not only acts as the initiator, but also as the main guardian of the substance of the bill from start to finish. This ensures stability and technical depth in legislation, but at the same time poses a serious challenge to the realization of people's sovereignty, which should be fully represented by the legislative body.

Behind the formal stage set by the constitution and laws, the reality of political power shows the existence of a very strong executive dominance or executive heavy. This phenomenon stems from extreme asymmetry of information and resources between the bureaucracy and the House of Representatives. The bureaucracy controls primary state data, has a massive research budget, and is supported by thousands of civil servants with specific expertise who work on a permanent basis.¹⁶ In contrast, members of the House of Representatives are generalist politicians with limited terms and minimal expert staff support, making it difficult for them to match the depth of analysis and data presented by the government. This imbalance makes the bureaucracy the most effective instrument for translating and securing the President's political agenda, turning the legislative process into an extension of executive power.

This bureaucratic power is also not monolithic, but is characterized by intense politicization and "sectoral ego." The process of drafting bills within the government often becomes an arena for battles between ministries or agencies. For example, the Ministry of Finance may argue with technical ministries about the fiscal implications of a policy, or the Ministry of Environment may clash with the Ministry of Industry over emission standards. This tug-of-war can shape the substance of the bill to reflect compromises between bureaucratic elites rather than holistic public interests. Furthermore, this initially closed process becomes a strategic loophole for oligarchic interest groups to lobby the bureaucracy, planting provisions that benefit their business agendas long before the bill becomes the subject of public scrutiny.

Two prominent case studies clearly illustrate this reality: the Job Creation Law and the Revision of the Mineral and Coal Law (Minerba). The formation of the Job Creation Law was driven by a special Task Force under the full control of the executive branch, whose process was accelerated extraordinarily, ignoring meaningful public participation in order to prioritize investment interests. Meanwhile, the revision of the Minerba Law shows how the bureaucracy in the energy sector, particularly the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, has become the main actor in designing regulations that provide certainty of contract extensions and incentives for giant mining corporations.¹⁷ In both cases, the bureaucracy acts not only as a technical facilitator, but also as an active political agent securing certain economic interests, often at the expense of environmental and social aspects.

The impact of this bureaucratic dominance on popular democracy is significant and tends to be destructive. Public consultation processes and Public Hearings (RDPU) in the House of Representatives are often reduced to mere administrative formalities to fulfill legal requirements, rather than forums for substantively absorbing and integrating the aspirations of the people. This closed and highly technocratic process effectively shrinks civic space, as non-governmental organizations, academics, and the media find it difficult to access initial drafts and conduct effective oversight. At its peak, there is a process of "de-politicization" of public issues, in which crucial issues concerning the livelihoods of many people—such as agrarian justice or environmental sustainability—are reframed as complex technical issues, so that the voices and concerns of ordinary people are considered irrelevant or "technically ignorant."

Democracy and Public Participation Policy

Democratic policies refer to a set of rules and actions implemented to realize democratic principles, such as people's sovereignty, human rights, and individual freedom within an organization to participate in government and social life. To build a solid foundation for democracy, it is essential to choose policies that are transparent, inclusive, and responsive to the aspirations of the people,¹⁸ Therefore, public involvement is essential to a healthy democracy in order to realize democracy.

However, democracy in today's reform era is liberal democracy, which gives freedom to individuals and forgets the meaning of individual freedom to be bound in an organization. Therefore, it is necessary to restore democracy that provides political opportunities for public participation where the people must be involved in organizations and can determine their choices, including their political attitudes towards their respective representatives, and this is called people's democracy policy.

People's democracy is a system of government that refers to the sovereignty of the people (people's power) and the active participation of the community in the management of government. It can be interpreted as "power from the people," and they have representatives in parliament who will discuss the representation of the people's interests. If these representatives ignore the aspirations of the people they represent, then based on people's democracy, these representatives can easily be replaced by the people. In people's democracy, there is no absolute power held by the supporting party, but rather the people who give them that choice and the people have the authority to replace them.

However, this people is not like the people in a country that uses liberal democracy, but rather a people organized in a political organization so that they have the political awareness to determine and replace their representatives. It is not because they are subjective, but because in countries that use liberal democracy today, the people are neglected in terms of organization, so that their understanding of politics in determining policy participation is minimal.

So far, facilitated public participation has been limited to the use of voting rights in general elections and the submission of contributions to the state through the payment of taxes and other official and legal fees. The space for community involvement in accordance with the wishes of the community is still very limited, even negligible. To achieve the goal of government that is from, by, and for the people, as conceived by Abraham Lincoln, democracy should provide for public participation in the form of electing leaders, paying taxes, and other official duties carried out by the state. However, in terms of involvement in public policy direction, the participation of the people is negligible because the state considers that the public (the people) already has representation in the trias politica system of government, where parliament, as the representative of the public, is obliged to determine policy.

The definition of public participation in political science studies can be interpreted as activities carried out by citizens with the aim of influencing political decision-making. It is not limited to casting a vote during elections, as this is only one aspect of public participation in democratic policies. Public participation in policy-making processes that bind all citizens is an effective way to achieve an equal relationship between the government and the people. In democratic countries, citizen participation in the policy process is commonplace. Public participation in the policy process is not only the most tangible reflection of democracy in everyday life but also beneficial to the government.

In line with the progress of the times, the demand for legal reform is becoming increasingly urgent, particularly with regard to public involvement. Participation is not only a right, but also an important foundation for a healthy democracy. Therefore, there is a need for profound transformation in the legal aspect so that public participation is not merely a formality, but becomes central to government policies and actions. Innovation in the delivery of laws, which are often complex and difficult for the general public to understand, is a key element that needs to be considered in this legal reform.

The issue of low participation raises various related issues, such as policies that do not fully reflect the needs of the community, injustice in the distribution of resources, and limited transparency and accountability in public decision-making.¹⁹ Because it is in the realm of public administration, the policy process is seen as an internal authority of the government, so that public participation is only seen as a formality to add legitimacy to the policy. The idiom black box is often used to describe the legislative process that takes place within the realm of the superstructure, which is evidence that the legislative process is closed to outside intervention, including the public.

To encourage public participation in policy direction, the people must involve themselves in organizations, or they must be organized to be provided with political and ideological education. This is so that the people are aware of the meaning of policy and democracy. However, if the people are not yet organized or organized within an organization, efforts to involve themselves in the framework of public participation will result in low awareness and participation of the people in determining policy. The reason is that the people are still unaware of politics, the meaning of democracy, and the meaning of participation if they are not organized. The urgency of such people's organizations is to provide a forum for political education, so that the people understand the meaning of participation not only in the momentum of elections, merely paying taxes, but in terms of participation in determining the direction of economic and political policies in the State of Indonesia.

Reconstruction of Democratic Legislation

The 1998 reforms made Indonesia aware of the importance of democratization in all areas. After more than three decades of the New Order's authoritarian political system, Indonesia entered a transition phase toward a more democratic political system in 1999. The separation of powers currently implemented in Indonesia divides power among three institutions: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. In practice, legislative power in Indonesia is exercised by the People's Representative Council (the President also has the right to formulate regulations together with the DPR), executive power is exercised by the President, and judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Given that Indonesia is a country based on the rule of law, a system of checks and balances is implemented so that the government system runs smoothly and fairly without any excessive power or reduction of power.²⁰

During Suharto's 32-year rule, known as the New Order, which was the antithesis of Sukarno's Old Order, the executive branch intervened in policies made by the legislative branch, so that the purity of policy-making for the public interest became nothing more than lip service by public officials. The principle of mutual oversight and balance allows for the creation of national policies that accommodate the interests of all the people.

When formulating policies, the legislature never returned to the people to seek their understanding, so that the policies issued to accommodate the interests of the people had to be thoroughly understood by the people. The legislature, as the policy maker, had to socialize to the people that there would be strategic policies carried out by the state through the legislature for economic and political interests, but so far the legislature has only performed ceremonial duties towards the people.

In redesigning legislation using democracy, the people feel directly from politics that it is very important to determine their attitude in formulating policies, in the sense that the role of a politically aware society in determining policy is very large, but to achieve this, people's democracy needs to be implemented. In people's democracy, the community is involved in organizations to elect their representatives who formulate economic and political policies. However, before making decisions on these policies, the laws and regulations provide opportunities for the community to understand and educate themselves about these policies. If there are several things that need to be revised, then the people's representatives will communicate the points that need to be revised in the policy, so that decision-making on policies is not only top-down, but also bottom-up, that is, policies that truly reflect the spirit of people's democracy.

So far, legislative policies have never given the people the opportunity to learn about the policies being implemented, because the democracy practiced in Indonesia is not a democracy that involves the people, but rather a democracy that is only a requirement for creating new powers that continue to change their skin. The problem of minimal public participation continues to occur in Indonesia today, because the legislature is considered to be the representative of the majority through participatory democracy in elections, so it is understood that the people have representatives in parliament.

Community participation is an important element in strengthening the democratic system. Through active participation, the community can convey their wishes and interests and monitor the running of the government. Community participation is not limited to elections, but also includes activities such as involvement in public policy-making, political discussions, and monitoring the implementation of laws and governance. The higher the level of community participation, the greater the community's control over state power. This prevents abuse of power and ensures that the actions taken by the government truly represent the interests of the people.

3. Conclusion

This study concludes that the legislative process in Indonesia is still dominated by the executive branch, technocratic bureaucracy, and political oligarchy, resulting in largely unfounded public participation. The liberal procedural democracy that emerged after the Reformation failed to achieve substantive justice because public participation was still limited to elections and other formal mechanisms. This study emphasizes that people's democracy based on public deliberation is a crucial prerequisite for restoring people's sovereignty in legislation. Therefore, strengthening people's democracy through substantive participation is not only relevant to enhancing legal legitimacy but also crucial to preventing the political domination of political elites and oligarchic interests.

It recommends redesigning the legislative process, emphasizing public participation as a central element, from the formulation of scientific drafts to the enactment of laws. Bureaucratic reform is needed to transform the role of parliament from a technocratic machine to a transparent, inclusive, and accountable facilitator. Parliament must strengthen its legislative capacity through research, expert support, and open deliberative mechanisms to counter executive dominance. Civil society organizations must serve as forums for public civic education to encourage critical awareness and advocacy. Furthermore, the legal system must be designed to ensure the participation of disadvantaged groups and prevent the aspirations of minorities from being marginalized by the majority or oligarchy. The implementation of these recommendations will strengthen the legitimacy of popular democracy and result in legislation that is more just, more responsive, and more people-oriented.