The principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur serves as a cornerstone of judicial independence, asserting that a lower-court decision remains valid until a higher court reverses it. While this doctrine protects judges from undue external influence, an overly literal interpretation can foster a perception of judicial immunity, enabling judges to invoke procedural or technical legal arguments to evade responsibility. Such immunity constrains the Judicial Commission of Indonesia (Komisi Yudisial, KY) in its mandate to supervise and enforce the code of ethics, especially when alleged ethical breaches are intertwined with the substantive content of rulings, as in corruption cases. Recent investigations involving judges in Surabaya (2024) and Central Jakarta (2025) exemplify this dilemma: the KY's comprehensive inquiries recommended severe sanctions in the Surabaya case, yet the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung, MA) dismissed the recommendations by invoking res judicata, a pattern likely to recur in the Jakarta investigation. These incidents expose critical shortcomings in KY's oversight capacity, where procedural doctrines supersede ethical enforcement, thereby weakening anti-corruption mechanisms. This paper argues for a systematic restructuring of KY's authority to mitigate procedural obstacles, enhance investigative powers, and ensure that judges can be held accountable for corrupt conduct. By refining the balance between judicial independence and accountability, the proposed reforms aim to promote a transparent, corruption-free judiciary in Indonesia.
Keywords: Judge Immunity; Judge Oversight; Judicial Corruption.
Judicial immunity is a fundamental principle that people around the world know about. It refers to the right of judges to examine, adjudicate and decide a case. It is an important derivative of the concept of immunity for state officials, such as the president or parliament. Judicial immunity plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and is part of judicial independence. It describes a condition in which judges should be free from external pressure and free from judgement on the correctness of their decisions. However, in practice, judicial immunity tends to glorify the decision itself. This is regardless of whether the decision is formally or materially correct. It is also regardless of whether it has been correct in providing considerations as well as fair decisions and providing legal certainty. Furthermore, it is regardless of whether there is an opportunity for manipulation. This can take the form of adjustments in accordance with the requests of certain parties. This is because it is part of a corrupt transactional reciprocity. Examples of this include the Surabaya District Court (2024) and the Central Jakarta District Court (2025).
Judicial immunity is a basic rule recognised by people across the globe. It refers to the right of judges to examine, adjudicate and decide a case. It is an important derivative of the concept of immunity for state officials, such as the president or parliament. It plays a vital role in upholding the law and is integral to judicial independence. This principle describes a situation in which judges must be free from external pressure and free from judgment regarding the correctness of their decisions. However, in practice, judicial immunity tends to glorify the decision itself, which is why it is important to consider the implications of this phenomenon. This applies regardless of whether the decision is formally or materially correct. It also applies regardless of whether the decision considers aspects that are correct, fair and provide legal certainty. Furthermore, it does not consider whether there is an opportunity for manipulation. This could take the form of adjustments. These would be made in accordance with the requests of certain parties. This is because it is part of a mutually beneficial corrupt transaction. Examples that can be given include the Surabaya District Court (2024) and the Central Jakarta District Court (2025).
The problem described above suggests a link between the application of the judicial community and the reality of the limitations of KY's role in supervising judges, especially in detecting cases of case trading. When the judicial community is applied in the strictest sense, there is no possibility for review of decisions, thus reducing the chance that supervisory institutions will detect supposed violations of the code of ethics. This suggests that there is an attempt to disregard the progressively distressing state of judicial corruption.
This raises a significant question: will judicial immunity from review of decisions considered to be technical judicial matters continue to be upheld? Conversely, KY, as the judicial oversight body, through its review of decisions, has the capacity to make a positive contribution by supporting a judiciary that is uncorrupted and free from malfeasance. What can be done to address this issue?
In previous discourses and in earlier literature, research on the implementation and limitations of judicial immunity in relation to efforts to reform judicial oversight institutions in order to eradicate corruption in Indonesia has been limited in nature and tends to focus on the context of technical judicial debates, without directly addressing the issue of corruption in the judicial world. Concurrently, worldwide studies have been more fundamental in their historical depiction of the dynamism of judicial immunity, but there have been discussions related to the issue of potential corruption by judges.
For instance, the examination of the discussion on the establishment of the standards of strict discipline and expertise, which, despite having been reversed through judicial review, is still frequently employed as a foundation for oversight by the Judicial Commission, necessitating the attainment of a consensus on this subject. Another issue is the difference in views between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission regarding judicial technicalities. The Judicial Commission is suspected of not verifying the accuracy of public reports when conducting its oversight. Instead, it immediately summons the reported judge to its office to request an explanation or clarification regarding the technicalities of the case, case administration, and the legal considerations and verdicts. The most recent comparable study is an article about the Supreme Court rejecting the Judicial Commission's recommendation to impose sanctions on a judge for Judicial technicality reasons.
Meanwhile, discussions related to judicial immunity in global studies are not directly linked to efforts to limit it or reforms to the authority of judicial oversight institutions. Based on existing research, studies tend to focus on its historical existence. Studies on the history of judicial immunity, for example, explore the origins of judges immunity, how the hierarchy of courts developed, and the connection between demands for accountability and judicial immunity in criminal, civil, administrative and disciplinary matters. Another study looks at judicial immunity in relation to civil rights in the United States. While the public wants an independent judiciary, it cannot allow it to be beyond reproach. Judges who are simply trying to apply the rules and deliver justice in every decision should not be threatened by lawsuits or questions about judicial immunity. Judicial independence is not a privilege reserved for judges, but rather a means of ensuring justice and equality in the courtroom. Another recent example is an article on judicial immunity and how it is applied to balance judicial independence and accountability. In practice, it is difficult to balance the independence and accountability of judges performance. Independence and accountability are often considered to be two sides of the same coin. Both are essential for an effective judicial system, in which judicial accountability exists to prevent unethical and inappropriate behaviour by judges. These two elements are linked by a concept called judicial immunity. It should be emphasised that immunity is not for the benefit of judges themselves, but rather for the sake of upholding the rule of law and the public interest.
This differs from studies related to corruption in the judicial system or judicial corruption. Some studies offer an important conceptual framework, defining judicial corruption as actions that alter the direction or content of judicial decisions for personal gain. These actions are classified into micro, meso and macro categories. This classification, particularly with regard to macro judicial corruption involving elite actors and complex negotiation strategies, is important for understanding the broader dynamics of corruption. One study that may be relevant concerns the risk of corruption in the activities of Ukrainian judges. The study identified factors such as the abuse of power, the acceptance of gifts and conflicts of interest. It proposed preventive measures, including the disclosure of personal data and financial reporting by judges. Finally, a similar study examined the correlation between corruption levels in the judiciary and politics. It found that reducing corruption in the judiciary could positively impact corruption levels in parliament. The study employed the Generalised Method of Moments IV (GMMIV) to analyse data from 28 high-income and 28 low-income countries.
The above studies all provide valuable insights into judicial technicalities, judicial immunity and judicial corruption. However, the issue of judicial immunity often overlaps with corruption in the judiciary. The studies do not sufficiently explain how judicial immunity relates to reforming judicial oversight institutions to make them more effective at combating corruption in the judiciary. This study therefore aims to offer a new perspective by integrating these two dimensions to formulate the limits of judicial immunity that would support more effective anti-corruption oversight. To this end, it will conduct an in-depth analysis of bribery case studies in the Surabaya District Court and the Central Jakarta District Court.
The research focuses on the relationship between judicial immunity and the limitations of judicial oversight by the KY. The key questions are: to what extent and within what limits should judicial immunity be exercised when faced with the need to eradicate judicial corruption? Finally, how can judicial oversight institutions adapt to play a greater role in eradicating corruption?
Considering all the issues related to the definition and conception of legal principles on judicial immunity and corruption, as well as the authority and supervisory role of judges, this study is better suited to being a comprehensive, normative legal analysis of how the principle of judicial immunity should be applied in corruption cases involving the adjustment of verdicts. This analysis will be conducted using a case study approach.
Here, legal research refers to a structured, scientific approach based on specific methods and ways of thinking. This involves analysing certain legal phenomena, carefully examining legal facts and ultimately formulating solutions to related problems. Here, normative refers to the fact that the research will examine the implementation of positive law (legislation) and written documents in action (facts) to determine whether the results of applying law to specific legal cases align with the provisions of legislation. In other words, it will examine whether the provisions of laws and regulations have been implemented correctly, enabling the relevant parties to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, it is also known as normative research because the research process involves discovering legal rules, principles and doctrines to answer legal questions. This process produces new arguments, theories, or concepts, which act as prescriptions for solving the problems in question. The designation of this research as doctrinal research is due to its theoretical and rational nature, and the requirement for its presentation to be based on the requirements of deductive logic, which demand precision, certainty and clarity.
As this is a dogmatic normative study, it will be based on the processing of secondary data. Secondary data is data obtained from literature searches, whether in the form of literature or related documents. The following materials are included: primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials.
The primary legal material in this study consists of court decisions in which the judges manipulated legal considerations to reach a desired verdict in accordance with the case's transactional agreement, as seen in case number 454/Pid.B/2024/PN Sby from the Surabaya District Court. This manipulation is also evident in decisions number 39/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt.Pst., Number 40/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt.Pst. and Number 41/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt.Pst. The secondary legal materials comprise related laws and regulations, including the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Law on the Judicial Commission, Judicial Power and the Supreme Court, as well as Joint Regulations on the Enforcement of the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct for Judges. These also include books and journals. Finally, dictionaries and encyclopaedias are used as tertiary legal materials. If possible and relevant, interviews with legal experts may be conducted to obtain additional perspectives.
This study will critically analyse and evaluate how the principle of judicial immunity has been abused or become an obstacle to effective oversight. It will also formulate recommendations on how judicial immunity should be interpreted and applied to guarantee judicial independence and open space for effective oversight mechanisms to detect and prevent bribery, particularly when it is proven that a decision has been altered because of bribery.
In order to understand the correlation between judicial immunity and judicial corruption, as well as the limitations of judicial oversight in this context, this paper will first explain the meaning of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity is a legal doctrine that protects judges from legal claims arising from their judicial actions. Its main purpose is to ensure the independence of the judiciary, allowing judges to make decisions without fear of personal liability.
Historically, judicial immunity was a political policy of the English king, used to deal with complaints from parties who were dissatisfied with local court decisions. Initially, it took the form of lawsuits/claims against judges by dissatisfied parties. At that time, the king considered this to be an inappropriate method of correcting judicial errors, given that judges essentially had absolute immunity when making decisions and could not therefore be prosecuted or held accountable for their actions unless they were clearly outside their jurisdiction. The king considered such lawsuits to be unnecessary, futile and costly. From the outset, appeals against court decisions never existed because they were more about accusations against judges who were considered to have made false or incorrect decisions. However, there is always a need for correction, so a good response is required, even though complaints about decisions will never change the truth contained within them. These errors in judgements have given rise to the doctrine of judicial immunity, which takes the form of a hierarchical court system starting from the court of first instance, through the court of appeal, to the court of review. Judicial immunity exists to limit liability for errors in presentation, interpretation and application of the law, ultimately legitimising anomalous judgements.
Based on the case of Floyd v. Barker, as presented by Lord Coke, the development of the doctrine of judicial immunity can be summarised into at least four main points. Firstly, the doctrine of "et infitum in jure reprobatur" means that questions about the judiciary's role will never end and will only lead to controversy. Secondly, court decisions can only be questioned by royal authority. Thirdly, judges are only accountable to the court above them. Fourth, accusations of slander against court decisions will continue to exist. These foundations of judicial immunity give rise to restrictions and legalise the need for decisions to be final in order to provide legal certainty and protect the independence of the judiciary from pressure by any party, thereby providing public trust in judicial institutions.
Naturally, people have criticised Lord Coke's idea that judges cannot be held responsible for anything they do as judges. It is important to distinguish between judicial and non-judicial actions of judges. Non-judicial acts can take the form of administrative acts, i.e. the actions of judges as public servants. Due to the subsequent evolution of the legal system in England, the distinction between judicial and non-judicial acts was recognised, especially regarding whether the judge had jurisdiction when acting. Historically, the hierarchical presence of higher courts was an attempt to exercise administrative control over all first-instance court decisions. In contrast, the current development is to ensure that judges act within their jurisdiction when rendering decisions. The courts in England have realised that not all judicial actions are official, and therefore those outside this scope should not be protected by absolute immunity.
The doctrine of judicial immunity has existed in England for centuries and was later adopted in America. Prior to the Civil Rights Act, there were cases that challenged this immunity. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favour of the defendant in Phelps v. Sill (1804). Judge Sill was charged because, in his ruling, he had appointed a guardian to oversee the estate of a nine-year-old boy. The main issue was whether a judge could be held personally liable for actions taken in their judicial capacity. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on the case of Ross v. Rittenhouse (1792). The case centred on a dispute relating to maritime and prize law concerning British ships captured during the Revolutionary War. It was significant because state court judge George Ross refused to comply with a ruling by the federal appeals court on the distribution of prize money. This created a significant legal and political conflict, highlighting the early tensions between state and federal judicial authorities in the newly formed United States. Ultimately, the case contributed to a legal precedent that established the supremacy of federal courts in matters of federal law. The next case was Lining v. Bentham (1802). This case concerns Mr Lining, a justice of the peace who was accused of contempt of the Court of Common Pleas in South Carolina. The key question is whether a higher court can punish a justice of the peace for actions taken outside the courtroom. Several other cases are not mentioned in this article.
The Stump v. Sparkman case (1978) is a landmark case concerning judicial immunity in the United States following the passing of the Civil Rights Act. In short, Judge Stump approves of the sterilisation of a fifteen-year-old girl at her mother's request, on the grounds that she was unable to supervise her. The girl underwent the procedure believing she was having an appendectomy and only realised she had been sterilised when she tried to have children after marriage but was unable to. Judge Stump was charged with violating a person's constitutional rights. This case has long set the standard for all subsequent cases challenging judicial immunity. In the Sparkman Test, the judge must determine whether the judge's actions were functions normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
In the Sparkman test, as applied in the case of Rheuark v. Shaw, it appears that the case centres on a claim by an inmate named Jack Rheuark, who filed a lawsuit. He claimed that there had been an unreasonable and excessive delay in preparing the trial transcript that he needed in order to appeal his conviction in a Texas state court. According to him, this delay violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The crux of the case is actually the question of the judge's administrative actions affecting the appeal, as well as the costs incurred for subsequent attorney fees. The Virginia Supreme Court then applied the Sparkman Test, considering that what had happened was not purely administrative action, but also legislative action that negated discussion of attorney fees in connection with prohibiting their assessment.
Ultimately, it seems clear that judicial immunity forms part of public policy. It is recommended that the requirements and limitations be formulated by the same parties that defined judicial immunity. It is necessary to distinguish between judicial actions carried out by a judge in their official capacity and other actions. This must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it is necessary to establish whether there was clear malicious intent. Was it done based on actual knowledge of right or wrong? Was there an element of disregard for the assessment of right or wrong? However, it should be noted that, if linked to malicious intent alone, it would be easy to accuse a judge of this.
In relation to civil rights, judicial immunity is derived from the theory of immunity, which is divided into three categories: immunity based on sovereignty, conditional immunity and absolute immunity. From the perspective of judges, who are government officials, judicial immunity is absolute, but its development has been questioned. Judges are immune as long as they remain within their jurisdiction and there is no malicious intent or corruption. Judicial independence exists to maintain equality of rights in the courtroom in the public interest, not to protect the position of the judge.
Challenges to judicial immunity are essentially demands for judges to be held accountable. This accountability primarily concerns the judicial institution. Once again, the emphasis is on protecting the public interest, not merely the interests of the judicial institution, let alone the personal interests of judges. The substance of judicial immunity and its application must strike a balance between judicial independence and accountability. In practice, it is indeed difficult to balance the independence and accountability of judges' performance. Independence and accountability are like two sides of the same coin. Both are complementary to an effective judicial system, where judicial accountability exists to avoid inappropriate and unethical behaviour by judges in relation to judicial independence. These two elements are linked to a concept called judicial immunity. There has been previous research on judicial immunity in Latvia and in relation to other countries, particularly the United Kingdom, the United States, and relevant international organizations. The results of this research are summarized in the table below:
| Country | Immunity Objectives | Judicial Accountability | Assessment of Decisions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Canada | Protects the independence of judges from public pressure; this is not a personal right, but in the public interest. | Not explicitly stated | Not explicitly stated |
| Czech Republic | Supports the performance of judicial duties without the threat of lawsuits. | Criminal, civil, and disciplinary liability exists; immunity is excluded in cases of malicious intent or corruption. | Judgments are exempt from review, except in cases of malicious intent or corruption. |
| Latvia | Supports the performance of judicial duties without the threat of lawsuits. | Not liable for damages resulting from decisions, except in cases of violation of the law or gross negligence. | Immunity from the content of decisions is not absolute, but practical assessment is limited. |
| Australia | Maintaining judicial independence in the public interest. | Not explicitly stated | Not explicitly stated |
| United States | Prevents external influence in the judiciary. | Full immunity except in cases of malicious/corruption; corrections are made through appeals. | The content of verdicts is protected except in cases of malicious intent/corruption. |
| Venice | Guarantees freedom from false prosecution; immunity is limited. | Criminal prosecution is possible with the revocation of immunity by the Judicial Council. | Not explicitly stated |
| Germany | Maintains the supremacy of law and the professionalism of judges | Civil immunity is limited; while trials are not subject to accountability, administrative matters can be supervised. | The content of verdicts is not assessed except for certain administrative aspects. |
| Kosovo | Ensures the smooth exercise of judicial authority. | Functional and procedural immunity applies during a judge's active term of office. | Not explicitly stated |
| Ukraine | Not explicitly stated | Criminal immunity and criminal procedure immunity apply if the person is a judge | Not explicitly stated |
| Belgium | Guarantees judicial immunity. | Criminal proceedings can only be initiated through special procedures, not by any investigator. | Not explicitly stated |
| European Court of Human Rights | This guarantees the rights of those involved in the judicial process, ensuring that judges' independence is guaranteed and respected by the state, rather than being at the subjective discretion of individual judges. | Comprehensive immunity is granted, except in cases of malicious intent or corruption. | Reviews of judges' conduct are permitted, provided that the content of the decision reveals it. |
| United Nation | Protect judges from intimidation and interference. | Grant functional (civil) and procedural (criminal) immunity, but not absolute immunity. | Not explicitly stated |
In the above research object, all of the countries in Europe and America, as well as the two international organisations, equate judicial immunity attached to judges as a reflection of the spirit of upholding judicial independence. It is affirmed that the starting point of immunity is not for the benefit of judges themselves, but rather to uphold the rule of law and public interest.
In a global context, discussions about judicial immunity focus on the substance of judges' absolute responsibility for their actions as judges. In this case, judges cannot be prosecuted, let alone punished, for criminal charges brought against them for their actions in conducting trials and rendering decisions, except where positive law applies to all people in the same way, as it would for a pure criminal act involving malicious intent or corruption.
Judicial immunity issues can sometimes be complex. An interesting case in point is the news from Milwaukee County, United States, in April 2025. The government ordered the arrest of Judge Hannah Dugan on charges of helping the undocumented immigrant Eduardo Flores-Ruiz evade federal immigration authorities, who were waiting to arrest him in the courthouse following a minor assault hearing. Judge Dugan allegedly directed federal agents away from Flores-Ruiz and guided him out of the courtroom through a secure exit while the agents waited in the hallway. Judge Hannah acted because she believed that the federal government's actions were inconsistent with public safety guarantees. However, the government was seeking to enforce immigration law and assert federal authority over local jurisdictions that were deemed to be uncooperative in enforcing immigration law. The government asserts that no judge is above the law, especially if they are deemed to be obstructing federal immigration operations. The public views this as an enormous attack on judicial independence and the politicisation of the law. In this case, it seems that judicial immunity has been applied in a more complex way. It is not simply a case of a judge issuing a favourable ruling after receiving a bribe, nor of a criminal act committed by another judge. Tensions between the central executive power and the judicial power in the state have led to a discussion of judicial immunity at a higher level.
Thus, it would be remiss not to consider the matter of judicial immunity in Indonesia. Does it truly reduce the system that has long existed in other countries that introduced a contemporary judicial system, such as the one currently in place in Indonesia? When Indonesia was first established, the judicial system was already in place to complement the government's structure and was part of the executive branch. For a long time—at least from 1945 until the transition period from 1974 until 1998, when it finally became a unified entity—judicial power was under the authority of the executive branch, specifically the President through the Ministry of Justice.
The judicial power was represented in Law No. 7 of 1947, also known as Law No. 19 of 1948, which dealt with the structure and powers of judicial bodies. The gist of paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 3 is as follows:
Nevertheless, given its administrative and financial subjugation to the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and departments within the Armed Forces, political discord will invariably be experienced. While it is independent, it is not truly independent. At that time, the courts were perceived to be rife with corruption, collusion and nepotism. Conversely, there was also a need to develop the judicial institution to handle all legal business needs in line with the influx of investment from abroad. This prompted the immediate establishment of a one-roof system for the Supreme Court.
Ever since the basic law on judicial power was established, the concept of judicial immunity has been emphasised. This means that any interference in judicial affairs by parties outside the Judicial Power is prohibited, unless this is regulated in the Constitution. The meaning of judicial affairs is not explained any further here, but it is frequently referred to in various rules connected to the Supreme Court and courts under the Supreme Court, and is also linked to what is known as judicial technicalities.
The absence of regulations defining what constitutes judicial affairs, and the technicalities involved, is particularly intriguing. However, the areas in which judges can be supervised comply with the Joint Regulation on the Enforcement of the Code of Ethics for Judges. This regulation was jointly drafted and agreed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, as stipulated in Joint Regulations 02/PB/MA/IX/2012 and 02/PB/P.KY/09/2012, which concern the enforcement of the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Judges.
Based on these provisions, it can be understood that the concept of judicial immunity in Indonesia takes the form of a prohibition on interfering in judicial affairs. This prohibition is specifically referred to by the technical term 'yudisial' in its development. Although there are no provisions explaining judicial technicalities, it is clear that judges have ten obligations and prohibitions to comply with when carrying out their duties, all of which are based on ten important principles.
Despite the regulations on judicial independence that grant judges autonomy and independence, the possibility of abuse of power will always exist. As Lord Acton (1834–1902) said, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely". Regardless of the motive, whether economic necessity or greed, cases of corruption involving judges as perpetrators continue to exist within the judiciary. The Global Coalition Against Anti-Corruption, Transparency International, defines corruption as the abuse of public office or power entrusted to someone who then misuses it. When corruption is specified as occurring in the judicial system, the image that is formed is that of judges accepting bribes. However, the reality is much broader, encompassing all forms of inappropriate influence resulting in injustice for all parties involved, including administrative staff and actors in the judicial environment, such as prosecutors. Furthermore, judicial corruption involves granting benefits to the interests of the court, which are not necessarily material, but can also take the form of sexual transactions, political or professional support, or assistance in avoiding or obtaining something, including through threats.
The most common form of corruption within the judiciary is bribery, which is categorised as petty corruption. In 2006, Transparency International conducted a survey to find out whether people involved with the judiciary had ever paid bribes. Of those surveyed, 1 in 10 people (21 percent of Africans, 18 percent of Latin Americans, 15 percent in the Asia-Pacific region and the former Soviet Union, 9 percent in Southeast Europe, and 1 percent in Western Europe) stated that bribes had been offered in various forms, including under the guise of other illegal fees, in order to receive assistance from court personnel. Users of the legal system pay either to influence the outcome of a case or ruling, or to cause delays. Bribes can be paid directly to judges or through intermediaries, such as staff assistants, lawyers or court officials.
This is exemplified by the prevalence of judicial corruption in Indonesia, a nation that was positioned 99th out of 180 nations in Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Index. Judges in Indonesia can be held accountable for criminal acts of corruption in the same way as other people. However, the implementation of judicial oversight is problematic, as there is a need to guarantee the rule of law and a high level of trust in the judiciary. Ensuring the credibility of a clean judiciary is paramount. This appears to be a challenge in itself, especially when looking at data from Indonesian Corruption Watch, which has been adjusted to the latest specific data on judicial corruption, as follows:
| No. | The Judge Involved | Position | Year of Arrest | Information Cases | Amount of Bribes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Syarifudin Umar | Judge at the Central Jakarta District Court | 2011 | Bribery for the management of bankrupt assets | Rp250,000,000 |
| 2 | Imas Dianasari | Ad hoc judge of the Industrial Relations Court of Bandung | 2011 | Bribery in an industrial relations case | Rp352,000,000 |
| 3 | Pragsono | Judge of the Corruption Court in Semarang | 2012 | Acceptance of bribes in a ruling related to the handling of a corruption case involving the maintenance of official vehicles at the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) of Grobogan Regency | Rp150,000,000 |
| 4 | Asmadinata | Ad hoc judge for corruption cases in Palu | 2012 | ||
| 5 | Kartini Juliana Magdalena Marpaung | Ad hoc judge for corruption cases in Semarang | 2012 | ||
| 10 | Akil Mochtar | Judge of the Constitutional Court | 2013 | Bribery relating to the election dispute at the Constitutional Court | Rp35,000,000,000 |
| 28 | Erintuah Damanik | Judge of Surabaya District Court | 2024 | Bribery in the acquittal of Ronald Tannur | Rp493,802,002 |
| 29 | Heru Hanindyo | Judge of Surabaya District Court | 2024 | Rp110,177,400 | |
| 30 | Mangapul | Judge of Surabaya District Court | 2024 | Rp776,392,284 | |
| 32 | Muhammad Arif Nuryanta | Deputy Chief Justice of the Central Jakarta District Court | 2025 | Bribery in a corruption case involving the provision of crude palm oil (CPO) export facilities | Rp60,000,000,000 |
| 33 | Djuyamto | Corruption Judge of the Central Jakarta District Court | 2025 | ||
| 34 | Agam Syarif Baharuddin | Corruption Judge of the Central Jakarta District Court | 2025 | ||
| 35 | Ali Muhtarom | Corruption Judge of the Central Jakarta District Court | 2025 |
Note: Table has been abbreviated to show selected entries. Full table contains 35 entries.
Data on judicial corruption, particularly that committed by judges, shows that a number of judges have been held accountable for criminal acts of corruption. Additional data reveals that there are records of judges involved in bribery cases at the Central Jakarta District Court who are still under investigation, meaning their criminal proceedings are ongoing. Judge Dede Suryaman admitted to accepting bribes under pressure and, after the money in question was reported and returned, he became a witness in the case of another judge. To date, he has not undergone criminal proceedings, but has received ethical sanctions in the form of dismissal as a judge. In summary, data on judges undergoing ethical proceedings related to alleged bribery can be summarised as follows:
| No. | The Judge Involved | Violation Details | Implementation of the Honorary Council of Judges (MKH) and Sanctions |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Endarto Rajamai | Received money from someone who liked him (a total of 66 payments amounting to Rp84,500,000) and fulfilled that person's request to meet in Palopo. | February 23, 2010 Transferred as a non-judicial judge for two years at the Palangkaraya High Court; Postponement of promotion for one year; 100% reduction in remuneration allowance for two years |
| 2 | M Nasir Q | Among them is the non-payment of tuition fees totalling Rp61,550,000 to the UMI Makassar Postgraduate Programme, thereby hindering the students concerned from completing their studies. | April 26, 2010 Honorably discharged as a judge |
| 3 | Eddy | Received Rp100,000,000 | May 24, 2011 Non-judge at the Jambi High Court for two years Revocation of remuneration benefits during the sentence period |
| 4 | Dwi Djanuwanto | Among them was requesting tickets from the defendant's family/lawyer. | November 22, 2011 Dismissed without honor from the position of judge |
| 5 | Jonlar Purba | Among them was the receipt of Rp125,000,000 in cash | December 6, 2011 Written warning 75% reduction in remuneration allowance for three months |
| 6 | Hendra Pramono | Among them was receiving Rp40,000,000 and other sums of money during the mediation process in a different case | January 4, 2012 Served as a non-judge at the Surabaya High Court for one year 100% reduction in remuneration allowance for one year |
| 7 | Nuril Huda | Received a sum of money from the Reporter for the inauguration of the Corruption Court in Palangkaraya | March 6, 2013 Non-Palu Judge 2 Years |
| 8 | Raja M Lumban Tobing | Among them is receiving a sum of money | November 6, 2013 Permanent termination with pension rights |
The above data on judges relates to those who were brought before the Judicial Honour Council's ethics hearing from 2009 to 2013 for alleged bribery-related violations. Further investigation of the data revealed that there was no additional information indicating that the reported judges subsequently underwent criminal proceedings. While this will not be explored further, it would be interesting to examine it in future research. However, the above data also shows the importance of viewing judicial corruption as a serious issue, especially in the context of judicial oversight.
Corruption in the judicial system is a serious global concern. There is a need for a system that can expose, discipline and dismiss corrupt individuals. However, the misuse of measures to combat judicial corruption undermines the independence of the judiciary as it is perceived as an attempt at intimidation. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Barnes states that questions about judicial immunity, including supervision of judges' ethics both inside and outside the courtroom, should not threaten judges who are purely trying to apply the rules and deliver justice in every decision.
In the Indonesian judicial oversight system, ethical violations related to corruption are regulated by the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct for Judges (Joint Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the Judicial Commission Number 047/KMA/SKB/IV/2009 and Number 02/SKB/P.KY/IV/2009). The obligations and prohibitions are set out in the form of principles and points, summarised in the table below:
| No. | Principle | Point | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Behave Fairly (in General) | 1.1.1. | The legal duty of judges is to carry out their duties in a way that respects the presumption of innocence. They should not expect anything in return. |
| 2 | Behave Fairly (in General) | 1.1.2. | Judges must be impartial both inside and outside the courtroom. They must also foster and maintain the trust of those seeking justice. |
| 6 | Behave Honestly (Giving gifts and the like) | 2.2.1. | Judges shall not solicit or accept promises, gifts, grants, inheritances, donations, awards, loans or facilities from lawyers, prosecutors, persons on trial, other parties likely to be tried, or parties with a direct or indirect interest in a case being or likely to be tried by the judge in question, if these could reasonably be considered as an attempt to influence the judge in the performance of their judicial duties. |
| 13 | Be Independent | 4.1 | Judges must carry out their judicial duties independently, free from any influence, pressure, threats or incentives, whether direct or indirect, from any party. |
| 19 | High Integrity (in General) | 5.17. | Unless otherwise specified by law, judges are prohibited from bargaining over verdicts, delaying case hearings, postponing executions or appointing specific attorneys to handle cases in court. |
Note: Table has been abbreviated to show selected entries. Full table contains 24 principles and points.
The above principles and points are guidelines used to supervise judges in determining whether violations of the code of ethics and conduct of judges have occurred, particularly with regard to corruption. These principles are applied both preventatively and repressively. Their implementation is regulated by Joint Regulations No. 02/PB/MA/IX/2012 and No. 02/PB/P.KY/09/2012, which concern the enforcement of the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Judges.
These regulations basically contain guidelines on the procedures for enforcing the code of ethics and moral standards for judges. In this case, these only apply to career and non-career judges under the Supreme Court. Whether a violation has occurred in a judge's attitude, statement and/or action is determined based on the provisions of obligations and prohibitions or norms formulated in the ten basic principles that judges must obey.
Furthermore, this regulation stipulates the jurisdiction of the ethical code of conduct, essentially emphasising that neither the Supreme Court nor the Judicial Commission can judge the validity of legal considerations or the merits of decisions. This is the fundamental principle of judicial independence. In addition to this, there are other, more technical jurisdictions. The first relates to the possibility of an investigation by the Supreme Court, or a joint investigation by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission if proposed by the latter, into public reports that implement the principles of high discipline and professionalism. The second relates to reports of alleged violations of the code of ethics that also constitute violations of procedural law. The Judicial Commission may propose to the Supreme Court that these be investigated.
Based on the grounds for filing appeals and cassations, as well as extraordinary legal remedies for review, it is clear that they all relate to requests for re-examination at appellate level. This is purely due to dissatisfaction from the relevant parties. An appeal was then filed on the grounds of lack of or excess of authority, errors in applying or violation of applicable laws, and failure to fulfil the requirements mandated by legislation. Specific reviews may be submitted for final decisions on the following grounds: There is new evidence or evidence that became known after the case was decided, based on evidence that was later declared false by the criminal judge; Decisive evidence was found after the case was decided that could not have been found at the time the case was examined; The decision granted something that was not demanded or more than was demanded; A part of the indictment was not considered without good reason and; There was a mistake by the judge or a clear error.
Based on the reasons for filing appeals at the appellate, cassation and review levels, it is clear that the purpose of these appeals is to correct the verdict and achieve justice. But what if there are other events, namely acts of corruption, outside of these mechanisms? This is, of course, a separate matter outside the scope of the main case. It will be processed separately.
Corruption in the judicial system is an unfortunate reality. The institution that everyone turns to for justice is tainted. Eradicating corruption from the judicial system must be a priority. Supervising judges could help to prevent corruption within the system. Reviewing court decisions is an effective way of preventing judicial corruption. This is because focusing on the analysis in the verdict reveals the gap between the evidence and consideration processes and the verdict, providing a more comprehensive view than reviewing the verdict alone. This can be compared with the statements of parties involved in and witnesses to the trial process, as well as audio-visual recordings of the trial. Judicial oversight in the form of preventing corruption can be seen in the Judicial Commission's oversight of judges in the first corruption case involving the Judges and related to the acquittal of the defendant in case number 454/Pid.B/2024/PN.Sby. Secondly, there was the corruption case involving the Deputy Chief Judge and the Judges relating to the acquittal of the defendants in cases No. 39/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt Pst, No. 40/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt Pst and No. 41/Pid.Sus-TPK/2024/PN Jkt Pst. The chronology of each case will be explained separately.
At the Surabaya District Court, the case against GRT related to the death of DSF. According to the indictment, after spending time with friends, including karaoke and taking turns to drink alcohol, the two decided to go home, where they got into an argument which turned physical in the lift. They did not go home immediately but instead tried to find CCTV footage to determine who had started the argument. However, no such footage existed. In the basement car park, the defendant initially saw DSF leaning against the left-hand side of a car. The defendant circled around DSF and asked if he wanted to go home with them. DSF did not answer. The defendant then got into the car and opened the front left passenger window. He asked again who DSF wanted to go home with. When there was still no answer, the defendant immediately started the engine, turned right and drove straight ahead. At that moment, the defendant saw DSF lying on the basement car park floor.
The judges' decision provoked an outcry. This was particularly the case when CCTV recordings of the incident were circulated, and the public criticised the decision. The Judicial Commission initiated an investigation into potential violations of the judges' code of ethics. This resulted in a recommendation that the judges be dismissed with honour. The Supreme Court responded that it would monitor developments in the cassation ruling of the case in question. Shortly afterwards, the Office of the Attorney General conducted a sting operation against several parties involved in the case, including the defendant's legal counsel, a judge acting as an intermediary and the judges, who were found to have engaged in a transaction involving the ruling.
Cases Nos. 39, 40 and 41 of 2024 concerning corruption in the processing of export licences for crude palm oil and its derivatives were examined, tried and decided by the same panel of judges. The case primarily concerns the criminal act of corruption committed by three large corporations, namely Permata Hijau Group, Wilmar Group, and Musim Mas Group, in facilitating the processing of export licences for crude palm oil and its derivatives.
After considering a large number of witnesses, experts, evidence, and the defendants' own statements, the judges in each verdict formulated legal facts and opinions with the same pattern of verdict regarding the charges, whereby the corporate defendants were found guilty of the acts they were accused of, but those acts did not constitute a criminal offense (ontslag van alle recht vervolging).
This section examined the correlation between the substance of the decision and the alleged transaction to identify any patterns or signs of anomalies that could indicate irregularities or adjustments. The analysis revealed significant discrepancies between the oral verdict read in court and the written verdict, including legal facts that were never mentioned during trial but appeared in the written decision, and vice versa.
The analysis revealed that the three cases have similar legal considerations and patterns, with judges formulating legal conclusions not fully supported by witness or expert testimony. The verdicts showed systematic patterns consistent with allegations of judicial manipulation.
The following key findings were made based on the chronology of events above:
Furthermore, based on the chronological description of events and analysis of the substance of the verdicts in the two judicial corruption cases mentioned above, it is evident that there is scope to determine whether a violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics has occurred in relation to the possibility of judicial corruption. In the context of decision-making aimed at supporting a clean and corruption-free judiciary, judicial immunity needs to be re-examined. Therefore, urgent analysis is needed on the limits of judicial immunity when overseeing judicial performance, particularly when there are strong allegations of corruption in judgment transactions.
Based on the above discussion and analysis, this paper demonstrates that judicial immunity is implemented broadly and comprehensively because it is a fundamental principle that guarantees judicial independence and that of judges, and is implemented globally. While the majority of countries studied implement judicial immunity almost absolutely, they still allow for accountability, particularly in criminal matters. This is because judges are treated the same as other individuals if they commit a criminal offence, including corruption.
In Indonesia, judicial immunity is applied to judges in proportion to their jurisdiction. Specifically, for ethical violations relating to criminal acts of corruption, the reported judge will undergo an investigation and trial process just like a non-judge. Interestingly, a judge who commits a criminal act of corruption and undergoes a criminal process first may not undergo the ethical process in accordance with usual procedures. This is because the judge in question must first be proven legally and convincingly guilty, and then administratively dismissed for violating civil service law. However, there are times when a judge first undergoes an ethical code enforcement process, in which case the reported judge will be dismissed either honorably (still receiving pension rights) or dishonorably (not receiving pension rights) by the Judges' Honorary Council. In this case, the judge in question may not necessarily undergo a criminal process.
Eradicating corruption in all areas, including judicial corruption, is important, and so is preventing and eradicating judicial corruption. Despite clearly handling investigations into alleged violations of the code of ethics, including those related to bribery or similar criminal acts of corruption, the KY, as the judicial oversight agency, faces difficulties in terms of its authority. This is because one of the processes it undergoes is to examine or review decisions, which is categorised as a violation of technical judicial provisions. The Supreme Court is prohibited from doing this, but as the parent institution, it has the flexibility to simply review decisions. Functional technical governance of the implementation of judicial oversight at the KY is required. This paper argues that reform of authority can be carried out without amending the constitutional or organic legal provisions related to KY's authority. A joint decision could provide a legal basis for KY to review decisions in the context of eradicating judicial corruption. This is because the Supreme Court and KY have the same supervisory authority over judges and should support each other to ensure a clean judiciary.
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